- From: Drew McDermott <drew.mcdermott@yale.edu>
- Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 17:15:03 -0400 (EDT)
- To: www-rdf-logic@w3.org
Warning: This message concerns philosophical issues that are perhaps not very germane to anything practical. Eminently skippable. [Seth Russell] If someone creates a formal system in which all axioms, syntax, and operations are specified; then the statements of such a system can be considered True\False and we can operate on that state with negation. I would call such a system "closed". The opposite situation is where the axioms and operations are not all known - perhaps the only thing that is known is the syntax of the statements. I would call such a system "open". My thesis, of course, is that the real world, that world in which we human agents seem to live and also the world we inhabit when we surf the web, is open and that there does not seem to be any absolute or formal meaning to the description of statements as True\False or the negation of that description. In other words Truth in the real world and on the web is relative. I think how a classical logician/philosopher (let's call him or her Pat) would object goes like this: If you know the *meanings* of the expressions of the language as well as their syntax, then for each statement P of the language you know what the world would be like if P were true. That's because knowing the truth conditions of P *is* knowing the meaning of P as far as Pat is concerned. Furthermore, if you know the meaning of P, you must know the meaning of (not P), because the world is constrained by (not P) to be a certain way if and only if it would be constrained by P not to be that way. (This is a bit clumsy, because I'm trying to avoid talking about interpretations and models.) Therefore, there is no particular problem with negation. Let's say an "open system" is a source of statements (a speaker uttering a series of claims; or the contents of a series of Web pages you have some reason to ascribe credibility to) such that the source may emit statements in the future that it hasn't emitted in the past. It's true that for an open system you don't know the entire claim the statement source is making. However, you can certainly know what it would mean for all the statements you *have* heard to be true. Further statements will further constrain the way things could be; the constraints may finally become inconsistent, in which case they don't describe any possible world. Is Pat being too glib? I'm not sure. One might argue that while one knows the meaning of terms like "not" and "possibly," the meaning of terms like "conservative" or "mindshare" is too fuzzy to be really known. Pat would no doubt counter that if you know anything about the meanings of those term, what you know must be expressed as explicit axioms; then those axioms (which use terms like "not" and "possibly") plus claims from the open system involving the contested terms will constrain the ways the world could be just exactly as far as they should be constrained. I am skeptical about the possibility of expressing everything we know about the meanings of terms as axioms. (Because I doubt that everything we know can be expressed in a deductive framework.) So I think there is room to disagree with Pat. However, I don't think I would say "there does not seem to be any absolute or formal meaning to the description of statements as True\False or the negation of that description" as Seth does. I don't see that there is a problem with truth, falsehood, or negation. Those concepts seem crystal clear, whether we are dealing with an open system or a closed one. There is a problem with the meaning of terms like "conservative." But "conservative(Antonin)" is true if and only if Antonin is a conservative. Is that problematic? And "not(conservative(Antonin))" is true if and only if Antonin is not a conservative. Perhaps Seth meant to say that there doesn't seem to be any way to *test* whether a statement is true. But that's a different claim altogether. -- Drew McDermott
Received on Monday, 9 April 2001 17:15:05 UTC