- From: pat hayes <phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
- Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 14:45:27 -0600
- To: Drew McDermott <drew.mcdermott@yale.edu>
- Cc: www-rdf-logic@w3.org
Drew, I am puzzled as to what you are talking about. ..... >Suppose I am trying to describe a theory as an object. (This is part >of our "homework" assignment.) For instance, I might want to >formalize "Einstein was looking for a unified field theory." This is >perhaps too ambitious, but part of our assignment is to describe our >projects, and many projects have, among other things, the goal of >finding a "theory to explain X." What sort of object is X in this >sentence? We might at this point start cataloguing the sorts of >things that can be explained. >.... >However, I think this is going in the wrong direction. Typically when >you try to explain something you don't yet know exactly what it is you >want to explain. So there is a sentence of explain in which the X in >"explain X" is a "situation" or "scenario," and to explain it is to >answer questions about it. You explain it to degree P if the >probability that you can answer a random question on a topic related >to the scenario is P. Can you expand a bit on what you mean by a "scenario" here? (Let's avoid the word "situation" which already has at least three distinct technical AI/logical meanings, none of which I think you mean. Correct me if Im wrong.) >Perhaps this is all wrong, but my main purpose in introducing it is to >explain why we need to describe scenarios. It would help to know what they were before trying to describe them. >... >The obvious way to represent scenarios is with lambda-expressions, >which bind variables that then take part in descriptions. In the usual meaning of lambda-expressions, they denote functions (from whatever their variables are interpreted to denote, to the value of the body when the variables are so interpreted.) Should we infer that a scenario is a kind of function? (From what to what?) >For >instance, if I'm trying to explain what makes cars go, the scenario >might be > >(lambda (x y) > (is-a x car) & (is-a y human) > & (able y (cause (move x))) > & (method y (move x) > (push (lambda (z) (is-a z pedal) > & (part z x accelerator))))) That seems to be a binary function to a truthvalue, ie a relation. However it also seems to say that the way to make the car go is to push a function, which suggests that you don't have the usual semantics of lambda-expressions in mind. (Or else 'push' is some kind of higher-order functional (?)) >If I'm trying to explain the relationships between two ontologies that >cover the same ground (as we in fact are), the scenario is > >(lambda (ont1 ont2 con) > (is-a ont1 ontology) > & (is-a ont2 ontology) > & (is-a con context) > & (often (lambda (e1 e2) > (expression e1 ont1) > & (expression e2 ont2)) > (lambda (e1 e2) > (meaning e1 con) = (meaning e2 con)))) > >(often s1 s2) is a generalized quantifier that means >"It's not unusual for a objects satisfying s1 to satisfy s2 as well." > >I hope the "metaness" of this example doesn't bother people. I have no idea what metaness you are talking about, which may be the source of my puzzlement. >If it >does, rephrase the whole discussion in terms of cars and pedals >instead of ontologies and meanings. It seems to be about neither of these, but about functions. ??? Pat --------------------------------------------------------------------- IHMC (850)434 8903 home 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office Pensacola, FL 32501 (850)202 4440 fax phayes@ai.uwf.edu http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~phayes
Received on Wednesday, 1 November 2000 15:41:59 UTC