- From: Patrick Stickler <patrick.stickler@nokia.com>
- Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 15:56:08 +0200
- To: Patrick Stickler <patrick.stickler@nokia.com>
- Cc: <jjc@hplb.hpl.hp.com>, "ext Chris Bizer" <chris@bizer.de>, <www-archive@w3.org>, "ext Pat Hayes" <phayes@ihmc.us>
On Mar 12, 2004, at 15:10, Patrick Stickler wrote: > > > G1 (ex:Water ex:colour ex:blue) > > G2 (G1 trix:assertedBy ex:Chris.) > > G3 (G1 trix:assertedBy ex:Patrick. > G2 trix:assertedBy ex:Pat. > G3 trix:assertedBy ex:Chris.) > > Now, given the ability to differentiate between authoritative > assertions and third party assertions, we have a set of three > graphs where we can terminate our trust determinations in > some authority/agent, and can then reason backwards whether > each of the graphs is to be trusted or relevant. > > ... > > Thus, our decisions about trust are fully grounded. In the case > of G3, trust is grounded in terms of the authoritative assertions, > but in the case of G1 and G2 in terms of third party assertions. > Note also, especially Pat, that if the knowledge store has support for keeping track of graph membership, the 'bootstrapping interpretation' to determine assertion/authenticity/authority of each individual graph can still be applied even when the system in question employs RDF/OWL reasoning, because any statements which are inferred about any particular graph would belong to some other graph (perhaps a system or system run-time graph, etc.) and not to the original graph being considered, and one would be determining assertion/authenticity/authority in terms of the statements in the original graph alone, not inferred otherwise. So one can just slurp in whatever graphs are out there, keeping track of graph membership (at the cost of perhaps some redundancy of triples) and can then apply trust policies in terms of both authoritative qualifications (tests limited to statements about a graph in that graph) as well as third party qualifications (tests on statements about any graph in any graph). But without that 'bootstrapping interpretation' limited to a particular graph, you'll never properly terminate your "chains of trust" and thus the model is useless. OK. I'll shut up now. Have a nice weekend, all. ;-) Patrick -- Patrick Stickler Nokia, Finland patrick.stickler@nokia.com
Received on Friday, 12 March 2004 09:00:07 UTC