- From: Pat Hayes <phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
- Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 19:30:48 -0600
- To: Brian McBride <bwm@hplb.hpl.hp.com>
- Cc: w3c-rdfcore-wg@w3.org
>At 16:24 04/02/2002 +0100, Jos De_Roo wrote: > >[...] > >>it of course all depends on the theory of RDF reification >>if we want to go the way that a statement is a functional >>property of a triple, then the answer to your question is YES > >Spot on Jos. That is the decision I'm suggesting the WG make. > >Early votes were for making this non-functional. DanC has pointed >out that his interpretation of M&S (which concurs with mine) is that >it is functional. > >The formal section of M&S defines rdf:Statement to apply to the >triple as Dan pointed out. However, the examples of reification >suggest its use for provenance, for which stating is more useful. > >I suggest that we don't make a big mountain out of this. There are >two concepts, (subject, predicate, object) and stating. Im arriving late, but ... what exactly is a 'stating'? A kind of object?? If you mean a statement as opposed to something syntactic, then we really need to work out what is being said here. There are at least three things, for a start, maybe four. There is the triple, the proposition expressed by the triple, and the assertion that the proposition or triple is true. Not the same kind of thing. The last can plausibly be identified with a class of interpretations (those where the triple is true, obviously), but the second is much trickier kind of thing to get hold of. It would be a hell of a lot simpler to just say that the bnode in a reification denotes something that has appropriate syntactic properties. Thats all we need to know in order to handle entailment cases like this, and its wonderfully noncommittal: it just treats the reification triples like any other RDF triples. >We have one URI, rdf:Statement. We pick one concept for >rdf:Statement to apply to, and the other will be defined in some >other vocabulary(s). Does it really matter a whole lot which is >which? It does if one of them requires taking treks into foundations of philosophical logic in order to say what we mean. Lets stick to concrete things like syntax, or else try to be as hands-off as possible. Pat -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- IHMC (850)434 8903 home 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office Pensacola, FL 32501 (850)202 4440 fax phayes@ai.uwf.edu http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~phayes
Received on Monday, 4 February 2002 20:40:09 UTC