- From: <ccjason@us.ibm.com>
- Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2000 16:14:01 -0500
- To: Yaron Goland <yarong@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
- cc: w3c-dist-auth@w3.org, Daniel Lovinger <danlo@Exchange.Microsoft.com>, Brian Andrew <brianan@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
>> The crux of the problem is that NFS, amongst others, does not necessarily refer to files using their path location. They often refer to files using File IDs which are completely independent of location. This means that the attempt to move the files from one part of the namespace to another in order to hide them won't work with NFS. NFS and similar systems will continue to be able to operate on the files, regardless of where they are moved to. This means that even if the move on the sub-directory succeeds it is possible for a NFS client to come in and open (without the filesharedelete flag) or change the ACL on a file and hence prevent us from deleting the file. Even if we attempt to change the ACL on a file to prevent others from accessing the file another user with a File ID and a higher access can always override us. >> Super. That's how NFS and a few of the file systems over which it often gets implemented are supposed to work. Once those files are opened, they can be deleted from the name space and still accessed via their file handle. It's good to hear that that little subtlty would continue to work.
Received on Friday, 28 January 2000 16:16:35 UTC