Re: http+aes

In message <
m>, "Michael Wojcik" writes:

>> You cut and paste the link, and anybody who receives it can view
>> the copyrighted object, and you have no idea who leaked it.
>Actually, I think it's potentially worse than that. Consider this case:
>- Publisher puts 100 copies of each resource on CDN, each encrypted with
>a different key.

What you propose is what's called "Thatcherizing" a document: During
the Thatchers government, they tweaked the spacing in a confidential
memo so that each recipients copy were unique, in order to expose
who leaked it to the press.

It is however, not an argument for the circus-crypto og http+aes

Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.

Received on Wednesday, 7 March 2012 16:33:19 UTC