- From: Peter Brooks <peter.h.m.brooks@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 14:44:20 +0200
- To: Lynn Andrea Stein <las@olin.edu>
- Cc: Renato Iannella <ri@semanticidentity.com>, Tim Berners-Lee <timbl@w3.org>, SW-forum Web <semantic-web@w3.org>
There may be an index to the set {human beings}, and, if there were, you'd be able to look up 'me' in the set. It'd probably be an object that linked to all the other objects in the set. The relation 'stated' links an object 'H' to a statement 'q'. p, the proposition that a human being exists, and that human is me, stands on its own, simply asserting this is the case. Which simply asserts that there is some human that is 'me' - it could be lots of them, or it might be an empty set. The relationship stated(p,me) links the 'me' to the statement, specifying that 'me' is part of the set of human beings qualifies it further. It's different from saying 'you are', because the person making the statement is linked to the proposition by the operator 'stated'. You could go on to express that: p2='∃y, y ∈ { human beings} s.t. y = you' Then I could assert that you exist by: me ∈ { human beings} ⋀ stated(p2,me). To assert 'Peter' exists: p3='∃z, z ∈ { human beings} s.t. z = Peter' then: me ∈ { human beings} ⋀ stated(p3,me). I could go on further: P4='me = Peter' then: stated(p4,me) You could then deduce, from p and p4 that I am Peter. Of course, you'd need to consider whether things that are 'stated' are true, or not, as a separate matter. On 22 May 2017 at 12:50, Lynn Andrea Stein <las@olin.edu> wrote: > >> On May 22, 2017, at 4:20 AM, Peter Brooks <peter.h.m.brooks@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Doesn't it make sense to express your point in logic, before >> expressing it in JSON, or other, notation? >> >> ∀q, q ∈ { statements made by H}, stated(q,H). >> p="∃x, x ∈ { human beings} s.t. x = me" >> me ∈ { human beings} ⋀ stated(p,me). > > Unless me (in these sentences) has some indexical property I am not appreciating, how is this distinct from rendering "you are", "Peter is", or "someone is"? > > Still, an interesting rendering of being as human-plus-self-asserting one's humanity, vs.Tim's authorship, Mark's (and Descarte's) thinking, and Simon's being-a-Pat-Hayes :-) > > - Lynn, who probably is. > -- Peter Brooks Mobile: +27 82 717 6404 Direct: +27 21 447 9752 Skype: Fustbariclation Twitter: Fustbariclation Google+: Fustbariclation Author Page: amazon.com/author/peter_brooks
Received on Monday, 22 May 2017 12:45:36 UTC