- From: Juan Carlos Cruellas <cruellas@ac.upc.edu>
- Date: Tue, 20 May 2008 14:04:33 +0200
- To: xml-sec <"public-xmlsec-maintwg"@w3.org>, Juan Carlos Cruellas <cruellas@ac.upc.edu>
Dear all, Some comments on time-stamps best practices. 1. I suggest to substitute the text: "DSS Profiles contain timestamps" by some text that provide some hints on XAdES way of using time-stamping for long term signatures and how DSS profiles deal with the request and verification of such issues. Proposed text: "ETSI has produced TS 101 903: "XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES)", which among other ones, deals with the issue of long-term electronic signatures. It has defined a standard way for incorporating time-stamps to XML signatures. In addition to the signature time-stamp, which should be generated soon after the generation of the signature, other time-stamps may be added to the signature structure protecting the validation material used by the verifier. Recurrent time-stamping (with stronger algorithms and keys) on all these items, i.e., the signature, the validation material and previous time-stamps counters the revocation of validation data and weaknesses of cryptographic algorithms and keys. OASIS DSS core specifies a XML format for time-stamps based in XML Sig. In addition DSS core and profiles allow the generation and verification of signatures, time-stamps, and time-stamped signatures by a centralized server" 2. Best practice 14. This reads: "Nonce and timestamp must be signature protected." Is this correct? I have the impression taht in this section we are speaking of time-stamps of signatures, ie, time-stamps generated after the signature has been produced so that we may prove that at certain point of time the signature already existed; how the time-stamp could be protected by this signature? In addition, a time-stamp is a secure piece of information: by the TSA's signature (RFC3161 or the DSS time-stamp) or because of the linking mechanism. Reading what comes before this text: "Nonces and passwords must fall under at least one signature to be effective. In addition, the signature should include at least a critical portion of the message payload, otherwise an attacker might be able to discard the timestamp and its signature without arousing suspicion. I have the impression that the Best practice 14 text should be: "Nonce and passwords must be signature protected." Regards Juan Carlos. Best Practice 14:
Received on Tuesday, 20 May 2008 12:05:13 UTC