- From: Peter Williams <home_pw@msn.com>
- Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2011 07:53:03 -0700
- CC: "public-xg-webid@w3.org" <public-xg-webid@w3.org>
Received on Friday, 29 July 2011 14:53:31 UTC
> > One difference is that, when you use <KEYGEN>, the browser that > > requests the certificate does not demonstrate knowledge of the private > > key, whereas in the proposed NSTIC architecture the certificate is > > issued by executing an issuance protocol (within the proposed TLS > > "server-initiated exchange") where the browser does have to > > demonstrate knowledge of the private key. http://old.nabble.com/The-%3Ckeygen%3E-element-td22921620.html > > Generally speaking, issuing a certificate to a party who may not own > > the key pair is dangerous. An attacker could submit to the issuer a > > public key belonging to a victim, and ask the issuer to sign a bogus > > certificate binding the public key to attributes chosen for the > > attacker, e.g. to the attacker's email address. Then if the attacker > > can somehow trick the victim into submitting the certificate to a > > relying party, the relying party may use the email address to send > > email intended for the victim to the attacker's email address. Drivel.
Received on Friday, 29 July 2011 14:53:31 UTC