- From: peter williams <home_pw@msn.com>
- Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2011 18:34:24 -0700
- To: "'Michiel de Jong'" <michiel@unhosted.org>, <unhosted@googlegroups.com>
- CC: "'Melvin Carvalho'" <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>, "'Kingsley Idehen'" <kidehen@openlinksw.com>, <jeff@sayremedia.com>, "'WebID XG'" <public-xg-webid@w3.org>, "'@eschnou'" <laurent.eschenauer@gmail.com>
- Message-ID: <SNT143-ds875BEB08EF8005537DA6C92AB0@phx.gbl>
>From the berner's lee writeup, as cited. "(Note that the information returned by looking up the user's webID is not trusted for access control purposes. Links are only followed out from the ACL. The server operator can also provide the server with other trusted information to include in the search for a reason to give the requester the access. Eventually, something else will be found which points to it)" So, in the berner's lee invention, from the validating entities perspective, trust your own file of outbound links - a file that is secure against hacking because of the system security boundary. If there exist links to the requesting entity's foaf card (or some other linked place links to it), assign the URI identity a local-issued token, probably based on account mapping. Only do this once webid validation is complete (which confirms a user's CONTROL over the cliamant's URI). Execute discretionary access controls using a classical reference monitor, based on nested grouping. This linking invention is largely identical with cert chains, of course. For decades now, the acl enforcing site site has been encouraged to (re)sign the certs/public-keys of such as verisign's trust anchor (whose n element cert chain links to you, and introduces you to anyone). As ACL entity, form up the composite chain of <acl accepting site's public key><ACL site's cert for verisign><Verisign cert to reseller><reseller signs you><you sign SSL client authn msg>. If it wants, the acl enforcing site can cut the chain down, and form <acl accepting site's public key><ACL site's cert for reseller><reseller signs you><you sign SSL client authn msg>. Or, one cuts it further <acl accepting site's public key><ACL site's cert for you><you sign SSL client authn msg>. Since certs are public, ANYONE can resign the public key within - and add the result to their trust store for use in there own chain discovery. This is intended, and normal. If you are REALLY old fashioned, having done one of the above the first time, you can reduce <acl accepting site's public key><ACL site's cert for you> to <public key of you> and store it in your acl site's trust store - doing away with all certs (once they have authenticated a parties public key). The next time someone presents <cert*> <you sign SSL client authn msg> you just ignore <cert*> and compute <public key of you><you sign SSL client authn msg> based on a guess that the inbound IP address (or cookie. or. other hint such as TLS clientHello extension) that locally maps to <public key of you>. This elimination of the <cert*> tends to bug some folks in the linking "intermediary" business, as they want the fact that *they* revoked a cert/link in cert* to influence the acl function of all so-called "relying parties". The above linking model based on certs is functional and globally available, in Windows, for browsers doing https and lots of other https consumer (windows forms doing https web services, for example, or java forms doing SOAP calls). This linking model was standardized by ISO, in 1988. The partial path from public trust anchor to claimant is known as the forward path. The validating entity supplies a reverse link path to the trust anchor (or any cert on the forward path treated as if, a trust anchor). The two partial paths conjoin, to make a sequence of signatures - that hopefully closes. Having closed the chain cryptographically, one inspects the naming points in the graph space - to overlay a name-centric trust model. (do I "like" this chain). In some cases, you don't like some of the elements (poor reputation, say), and you go looking for an alternative path, that avoids countries whose namesspace YOU don't like - for some political reason (for example). I keep hoping someone will launch a sparql service that given URI X and URI Y and URIs {A, B C} as hints, will return a link path between X and Y that have A or B or C in the path (probably). A B C are known as well-known trust points. Social adoption works best when none of A B or C has particular monopoly power, and they are selected to be independent and autonomous of each other and political control. From: public-xg-webid-request@w3.org [mailto:public-xg-webid-request@w3.org] On Behalf Of Michiel de Jong Sent: Saturday, April 09, 2011 12:12 PM To: unhosted@googlegroups.com Cc: Melvin Carvalho; Kingsley Idehen; jeff@sayremedia.com; WebID XG; @eschnou Subject: Re: [unhosted] Re: Unhosted.org Project and WebID Hi all! We should definitely work together. I know WebID through Henry Story, and have always found it intriguing. Let's
Received on Tuesday, 12 April 2011 01:36:04 UTC