- From: Serge Egelman <egelman@cs.cmu.edu>
- Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2008 14:49:30 -0500
- To: William Eburn <weburn@hisoftware.com>
- CC: Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com>, public-wsc-wg@w3.org
No, no one would be responsible because it says 90%. That means there's a 10% chance of something bad happening. Guess what? That 10% was realized. This is exactly why no one is going to say a website is 100% secure, because there's no way of knowing. And if we say that no website is 100% secure, this is going confuse users and dilute the indicator. There currently are no indicators out there that guarantee a website is 100% secure (i.e. indicators issued by someone other than the website owner). That would be an insane business move because of the liability attached. This is also applies to the opposite case: web browser phishing warnings that block a page are only issued once the website has been verified. A company would have to be damn sure of their heuristics if their process is entirely automated and without oversight. A site that is incorrectly accused of being a phishing website may sue for defamation or libel. serge William Eburn wrote: > Hello all, > > As you may know, HiSoftware has content and application testing tools > around privacy, security, accessibility, general content quality, > corporate branding, and several factors of site quality. > > I am concerned that if we give some de facto score but do not consider > the content or application, then would I not as a user of the browser > that gave me the information have the right to sue their corporation if > I went to a site, the score said 90% reliable and I entered all my PII > and the next user saw that it was 90% secure -- knew that the scoring > system was flawed because it didn't consider the content, or the > application and in this case used a simple SQL Injection to grab all the > PII out of the system (including mine), then opened multiple bank > accounts, got car loans, and did whatever, causing me great harm. While > it's true I was able to cancel the charges as being fraudulent, it took > over a year to do so. Would the company that provided the page score be > responsible in a court of law? > > Please note, this would be different depending on which country you were > in. > > I think, from our perspective the education of the user to the state of > the different security indicators is important but for us to assign any > value judgment on them would at best, be foolish. Immediately we could > never assign 100%, because as part of the working group we've already > said that we aren't examining the content or application being viewed by > the user agent. So it would be my vote to eliminate the idea of a page > score entirely. What I'm suggesting is that we show them the > information, educate the user as to what it means, but assign no value. > > This is just my two cents on the page score topic. > > Thanks, > Bill > > > -----Original Message----- > From: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org [mailto:public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org] > On Behalf Of Anil Saldhana > Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2008 2:18 PM > To: public-wsc-wg@w3.org > Subject: Re: Is the padlock a page security score? > > > Right on the point, Tim. > > We have a tendency to quote personal experiences/behavior to equate it > to the general behavior of the masses. A security indicator to one does > not mean an indicator to everyone. > > WG has had discussions that the padlock is not sufficient to ensure a > secure behavior. Hence page security score, ev cert bar etc etc. :) > > Timothy Hahn wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> This whole discussion is subjective. What is useful for one person > could >> very well be useless to someone else. >> >> An analogy - weather forecasts about the possibility of rain today. > Does >> such a score indicate whether I will get rained on? No. Does it help > me >> decide whether or not to wear a hat or carry an umbrella? Yes. There > is >> no way that people other than meteorologists (and some would argue, > even >> them) will accurately interpret isobars, cloud patterns, and doppler > radar >> to determine whether it will rain. But people can get a feeling for > the >> chances of rain based on a 0-100% estimate. >> >> I think the same is true for the notion of a page security score. > Does it >> imply that the user will definitely, without a doubt, not get "taken"? > No. >> Does it give the user something with which to make a choice? Yes. > In >> this light, I still feel that page security scores are good things to >> consider. >> >> Regards, >> Tim Hahn >> IBM Distinguished Engineer >> >> Internet: hahnt@us.ibm.com >> Internal: Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS >> phone: 919.224.1565 tie-line: 8/687.1565 >> fax: 919.224.2530 >> >> >> >> >> From: >> <michael.mccormick@wellsfargo.com> >> To: >> <ifette@google.com>, <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com> >> Cc: >> Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS, <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>, >> <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com> >> Date: >> 01/10/2008 01:34 PM >> Subject: >> RE: Is the padlock a page security score? >> >> >> >> I would ask the same question about a binary indicator. The padlock > does >> not mean it's safe to enter a credit card. >> >> From: Ian Fette [mailto:ifette@google.com] >> Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2008 12:26 PM >> To: Anil Saldhana >> Cc: McCormick, Mike; hahnt@us.ibm.com; public-wsc-wg@w3.org; >> Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com >> Subject: Re: Is the padlock a page security score? >> >> I still don't understand what anything beyond a binary result is > supposed >> to tell a user. I'm on a site with "Medium" security - what does that >> mean? Does that mean that I should give them my credit card or not? >> >> On Jan 10, 2008 10:00 AM, Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com> > wrote: >> Maybe there is an opportunity to associate "High/Medium/Low" or >> "Strong/Medium/Low" based on page security score with the padlock. >> >> michael.mccormick@wellsfargo.com wrote: >>> Sure, I agree the padlock is a binary representation of a boolean >> security >>> score formula based on a single security variable (SSL on main page). > A >>> degenerate case IMHO - but still technically a page security score. >>> >>> A security score algorithm should take into account most (if not all) > of >> the >>> variables we enumerated under "What is a Secure Page?" Perhaps the > note >>> should state that explicitly. Then padlocks wouldn't qualify. >>> >>> _____ >>> >>> From: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org > [mailto:public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org] >> On >>> Behalf Of Timothy Hahn >>> Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2008 10:40 AM >>> To: public-wsc-wg@w3.org >>> Subject: Re: Is the padlock a page security score? >>> >>> >>> >>> Mez, >>> >>> I'll toss in my view that the padlock is an example of a page > security >>> score. In most user agents, this seems to be pretty much "binary" > (on >> or >>> off) though I think we've heard from some folks that there are some >>> "embellishments" on their display of the icon which would provide > more >>> gradations based on information received. >>> >>> On the bright side of such a visible item - it is relatively easy to >>> describe and for people to grasp the meaning of. >>> >>> On the down side of the padlock - ... well, we've had lots of that >>> discussion on this list already - see the archives. >>> >>> Regards, >>> Tim Hahn >>> IBM Distinguished Engineer >>> >>> Internet: hahnt@us.ibm.com >>> Internal: Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS >>> phone: 919.224.1565 tie-line: 8/687.1565 >>> fax: 919.224.2530 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: "Mary Ellen Zurko" <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com> >>> >>> To: public-wsc-wg@w3.org >>> >>> Date: 01/10/2008 11:10 AM >>> >>> Subject: Is the padlock a page security score? >>> >>> _____ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If not, why not? >>> >>> Mez >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> Anil Saldhana >> Project/Technical Lead, >> JBoss Security & Identity Management >> JBoss, A division of Red Hat Inc. >> http://labs.jboss.com/portal/jbosssecurity/ >> >> >> >> > -- /* PhD Candidate Vice President for External Affairs, Graduate Student Assembly Carnegie Mellon University Legislative Concerns Chair National Association of Graduate-Professional Students */
Received on Thursday, 10 January 2008 19:50:23 UTC