- From: Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
- Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2007 23:18:38 +0200
- To: Web Security Context Working Group Issue Tracker <sysbot+tracker@w3.org>
- Cc: public-wsc-wg@w3.org
On 2007-08-12 14:53:34 +0000, Web Security Context Working Group Issue Tracker wrote: > ISSUE-103: Should unknown CAs and self-signed certificates be > treated the same way? [Techniques] > > http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/track/issues/ > > Raised by: Thomas Roessler > On product: Techniques > > Assuming that self-signed certificates are treated as pure > containers, what should the treatment be for unknown CAs? > > Choices include: > > - Perform path validation and cause errors as one would for a known and > trusted CA, but don't display identity indicator? (This would effectively > make the "weak" and "strong" TLS notions orthogonal to whether we trust a CA.) > > - Ignore path validation and treat as pure containers for cryptographic material? - Treat like self-signed certificates also with regard to the probation period? Also, I suspect that the "weak policy OIDs" bucket [see ACTION-287] might hold some relevance for resolving this issue. -- Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org>
Received on Wednesday, 29 August 2007 21:18:57 UTC