- From: Dan Schutzer <dan.schutzer@fstc.org>
- Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2007 16:06:14 -0400
- To: "'Ian Fette'" <ifette@google.com>, "'Close, Tyler J.'" <tyler.close@hp.com>
- Cc: <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <013c01c7ea78$0e3ad420$6500a8c0@dschutzer>
I would support the distinction and the use case where a user goes to a trusted site that he frequents often and is notified that the trusted site has been compromised and is now spreading crud. What one does to address this use case is of course another matter, including who do I trust - the trusted website or the notification that the trusted website has been compromised. _____ From: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org [mailto:public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org] On Behalf Of Ian Fette Sent: Wednesday, August 29, 2007 3:50 PM To: Close, Tyler J. Cc: public-wsc-wg@w3.org Subject: Re: The purpose of Note use-cases I did not point out that an existing use case violates any principle. I pointed out the fact that we had an existing use case that dealt with browsers being aware of reputation services. I want to make that distinction very clear. I think it's fine for us to acknowledge the fact that services and methods exist to say "a site is bad" either for reasons of phishing, malware, or otherwise. I don't think we should delete any use cases, nor do I think there is duplication. As I stated earlier, I think the use case I proposed is different, and here's why. Malware is something of a special case. Sites distributing malware are often sites that are trusted, known, and high-traffic, which have been compromised and are now spreading crud to users. This is often difficult for a user to understand, because a user might think "I trust example.com, I go there every day. Now I'm being told that this is a bad site." This is very different from "I'm being told example.com is bad and I've never been there before and I know nothing about it." That's what differentiates my use case from the use case I referred to in today's meeting, and why I think it should be added. Also, I don't want to get into the whole issue of processes and rec proposals etc, nor do I want to get into methodology of how a user agent finds a site to be bad. I just want to acknowledge the fact that many user agents do this already, and see if we can't make some recommendations on how to present such information to users in a meaningful fashion. I am not trying to advocate anything in particular - either methods for finding malware, warnings to present, anything - all I'm trying to say is that I think this is an important issue that I think we should discuss. Also, I wasn't going to bring this up, but this was sent out a long time ago, there was email discussion about it, and consensus was declared ( <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-wsc-wg/2007Aug/0149.html> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-wsc-wg/2007Aug/0149.html) and so I do find it a bit disconcerting that I am just now hearing about these objections. I'm happy to re-write the use case to address your issue of not proposing any particular methods (blacklisting, etc) but I fail to see the more fundamental problem that you seem to believe exists. On 8/29/07, Close, Tyler J. <tyler.close@hp.com> wrote: This WG is chartered to "... to enable users to come to a better understanding of the context that they are operating in when making trust decisions on the Web". The way I see it, the Note use-cases should provide concrete scenarios documenting the different kinds of trust decisions users need to make when using the Web. When evaluating recommendation proposals, we should then see how they work in these scenarios, to judge whether or not the user is being helped. In my opinion, the Note use-cases do not list the techniques that are on our agenda to study as possible recommendations. Were that the case, there are several techniques that are not represented. I think there is a basic issue of fairness in ensuring that the use-cases only describe user decisions, and not tilt the playing field toward any particular recommendation proposal by presupposing the use of a particular mechanism. I think Ian correctly pointed out in today's telecon that one of the existing use-cases violates this principle. See: http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/note/#any-iui-2 In my opinion, this use case is also a duplicate of the user decision described in: http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/note/#any-iui-1 I propose that to resolve this issue, we delete the first use case listed above from the Note, and encourage Ian to submit a recommendation proposal that covers the techniques he thinks this WG should be investigating. I think this resolution clarifies the purpose of the use-cases, making the Note better, and gets Ian's topics onto the agenda of things being considered for our FPWD. These are the results that I think we all want. --Tyler
Received on Wednesday, 29 August 2007 20:06:46 UTC