- From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
- Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2006 11:42:18 +0000
- To: Amir Herzberg <herzbea@macs.biu.ac.il>
- Cc: "Michael(tm) Smith" <mikes@opera.com>, public-wsc-wg@w3.org
Even though we're jumping the gun quite a bit, this is interesting, so... Amir Herzberg wrote: > Making a more complex padlock is, imho, a wrong approach. I agree, if the additional complexity is reflecting TLS protocol options then I don't think its worth that much. If however, the additional complexity were to map to the broader security context (and no, I dunno how) then that super-padlock (or whatever) might be the right thing to do. Just one vague example, say if a user could "security-mark" a site (like a bookmark, but telling the browser to be anal about security whenever that site is visited), then maybe the browser could react if something significant about the site changes - its that kind of thing (and not counter-mode-AES) that I'd like to see cause the padlock to quiver, Cheers, Stephen.
Received on Monday, 27 November 2006 11:41:47 UTC