- From: Brad Porter <brad@tellme.com>
- Date: Wed, 01 Nov 2006 10:49:38 -0800
- To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
- Cc: Mary Ellen Zurko <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>, public-wsc-wg@w3c.org
- Message-ID: <4548EC42.7050400@tellme.com>
Do we have user interface design or usability expertise in the group or access to that expertise? I agree that user acceptance and behavior are difficult points for consensus. I like Phillip's model and would suggest it is a fine abstract model to be begin with. That said, it is a very CS-centric model (as much as I've tried, I still find it difficult to model my Mom as a finite state machine.) In my opinion, there's still nothing that beats concrete user observation and feedback. I also wonder if we have a concrete list of states/tasks/problems/UI capabilities that we want to focus on first? As immensely enjoyable as abstract framework discussions can be, nothing generates shared understanding faster than concrete problems. --Brad Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote: > Picking up on the comments by Mez. > > Before we do experiments we need a theory. We are not testing the > usability of specific browsers, we are testing a theory of usability. > > If we are to have a theory we need to start from a model. > > My model of the user is a finite state machine that is attempting to > complete a task. My first theory is that the more states and the more > environmental variables we require in the state machine the worse the > usability will be. My second theory is that the harder it is for the > user to determine which state they are in the harder it will be. In > particular if there is a mismatch between the semantics that a signal > is assumed to have (this page is safe) and those that it actually has > (the transport was encrypted). > > For example we are all familiar with the dialogue box that pops up the > first time we navigate from a secure to an insecure page and the box > that comes up when a page has mixed secure/insecure content. I believe > that both boxes are crutches, security theatre to give the semblance > of security while admitting that they are a fraud. > > If the transition matters it should always be apparent to the user > which state they are in. Even if the user leave the dialogue boxes on > they cannot be expected to remember what they mean. Instead of telling > me that there is a mixture of secure and insecure content just don't > tell me that the page is 'secure'. > > Hypothesis: Any warning dialogue that contains the clickbox 'do not > show this warning again' indicates a broken security design as well as > a broken usability design. > > Hypothesis: It is possible to design a user interface that provides > the user with the information they need without transitional dialogue > boxes. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Mary Ellen Zurko [mailto:Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com] > *Sent:* Wednesday, November 01, 2006 9:25 AM > *To:* Hallam-Baker, Phillip > *Cc:* public-wsc-wg@w3c.org > *Subject:* control, data, users > > > One of the topics I want to bring up here and at the f2f is how > we'll deal with the issue of level setting around and agreeing on > user acceptance and behavior. It's my belief that this will be one > of the biggest difficulties in coming to concensus; how we'll > agree about usability and users. It would be optimal if we could > do some actual user studies, although that wouldn't cover "users > learn" types of arguments. Something to think about, and I > appreciate all thoughts on that topic. > > As a side note, I would like to encourage folks to discuss any of > the items on the agenda of the f2f beforehand on the email list, > particularly if they have input and might not make it. > > Mez > > Mary Ellen Zurko, STSM, IBM Lotus CTO Office (t/l 333-6389) > Lotus/WPLC Security Strategy and Patent Innovation Architect > > > > *"Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>* > Sent by: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org > > 10/31/2006 12:28 PM > > > To > Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS, <public-wsc-wg@w3c.org> > cc > > Subject > RE: Greetings > > > > > > > > > > The term 'frustrated by the various "artifacts"' reminded me that > there is another important issue here, the insecure clutter that > is getting stuffed into browsers without thought for the security > issues. > > For example, favicons have been spreading quickly. But there is no > bar to having a favicon that looks like a padlock icon. It is > pretty easy to create a favicon that makes a page appear to use SSL. > > We need to have a clear distinction between control and data. > Users should be able to trust the browser to display content in > the content window and restrict the chrome area to data that is > trustworthy. > > For years people have been telling me that 'users want' flash > animations, etc. that can make whatever use of the user's screen > they choose. Now the same people tell me to use Firefox pretty > much because of what it does not allow. > > The control bar on my broswer belongs to me, it should not be > possible for a content provider to disable it. > > We have a 'stop downloading' button. Why can't I click that to > stop the execution of Javascript &ct. on a page? > > > Clearly it will take time to get from where we are to where we > want to be. But it would be nice if there was at least a clickbox > that would enable a single comprehensive set of browser > configurations that is secure and repeatable. Ad hoc constraints > on javascript are creating as much of a problem as the early spam > filters that kicked out 10% false positive. If the set of > capabilities was predictable and detectable content providers > would be much better off. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org > [mailto:public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org] *On Behalf Of *Timothy Hahn* > Sent:* Tuesday, October 31, 2006 10:10 AM* > To:* public-wsc-wg@w3c.org* > Subject:* Greetings > > > Hello! > > My name is Tim Hahn and I am looking forward to working with this > group. > > I have been somewhat frustrated by the various "artifacts" which > different HTTP clients/browsers use to convey whatever > security-related information has been sent from HTTP servers to > which the browser is connected. The current state-of-the-art > seems to be more annoying to users than informative, and even for > security professionals can be confusing to interpret. > > I have worked for IBM for 16 years as a developer, designer, > architect, and strategist. I have been working on several of > IBM's directory and security-related product offerings for over 10 > years, dating back to Distributed Computing Environment, through > LDAP directory services, and currently on authentication, access > control, and identity management product offerings. I have > participated in several standards bodies in the past including > DMTF and IETF working groups. > > I am looking forward to meeting all of you, either in person in > NYC or on the list. > > Regards, > Tim Hahn > > Internet: hahnt@us.ibm.com > Internal: Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS > phone: 919.224.1565 tie-line: 8/687.1565 > fax: 919.224.2530 >
Received on Wednesday, 1 November 2006 18:50:15 UTC