Integrating the chrome (Was: ACTION6: URL display as anti-pattern)

 

I wrote:
> We would still need to do some work to integrate this display into the
> browsing workflow, so that the site identifier is not ignored by the
> user. I've got some ideas on how to do that.

The main idea on this front is to continue pushing forward with
graphical separation between what the browser says and what the visited
page says. In particular, I think form filling options should be
presented from the chrome, rather than from the page content. This
change has the effect of drawing the user's "locus of attention" away
from the page and into the browser's chrome area, so that indicators,
like the site identifier, are noticed by the user.

For example, the modified browser would contain a "form fill" button in
the chrome area. When visiting a page requesting the user's credit card
information, the user would position the input focus in the
corresponding text field and then either click the "form fill" button,
or hit the down arrow key. Either command would cause a drop down list
to appear below the "form fill" button, from which the user can select
the text to fill. It is important that the "form fill" button be located
immediately adjacent to the chrome's site identifier widget, so that the
information is in the user's locus of attention. A further step would be
to disable form filling entirely for sites that the user has not
established a relationship with. For example, when using the Petname
Tool, a user establishes a relationship with a site by assigning a
petname to the site. A step further would be for the browser to remember
what information the user has previously submitted to what sites and
indicate in the form filling drop down whether or not the user has
previously agreed to give the site the requested information. This same
user interface should be used for password input fields, though possibly
using "***" characters in the drop-down list, instead of the actual
text.

Under the above regime, the user becomes habituated to using the form
filler to provide input to web pages, and to having their locus of
attention drawn to the chrome's indicators. In a phishing attack, the
user would activate the form filler, drawing their attention to the
chrome's indication that the user does not have a relationship with the
host site, and to the indication that the user's credit card number has
never been provided to the host site. At this point, we can hope that a
significant number of users would become suspicious. Some amount of user
training might be required to teach users that when they encounter this
situation they should abandon the current transaction and attempt to
visit the expected site via some other means, such as a previously
stored bookmark.

Tyler

Received on Monday, 4 December 2006 23:12:33 UTC