- From: Boris Zbarsky <bzbarsky@MIT.EDU>
- Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2011 00:34:58 -0600
On 1/5/11 12:29 AM, Glenn Maynard wrote: > Stricter requirements like SSL makes more sense for the latter case. > I'd put geolocation squarely in the first, lesser group. I wouldn't. Just because a user trusts some particular entity to know exactly where they are, doesn't mean they trust their stalker with that information. I picked geolocation specifically, because that involves an irrevocable surrender of personal information, not just annoyance like disabling the context menu. >> Or various kinds of cross-site script injection (which you may or may not >> consider as a compromised server). > > I suppose this is analogous to buffer overflows in native code. As opposed to a virus infection (which would be similar to a compromised server), say? Yes, that seems like a good analogy. One difference is that buffer overflows are primarily a problem insofar as you don't control your input. With a website, you never "control your input": anyone can point the user to any url on your site. Even urls you didn't think of existing. -Boris
Received on Tuesday, 4 January 2011 22:34:58 UTC