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[whatwg] Dealing with UI redress vulnerabilities inherent to the current web

From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@dione.cc>
Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2008 13:41:06 +0200 (CEST)
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0809271329320.10659@dione.cc>
On Sat, 27 Sep 2008, Robert O'Callahan wrote:

> Default permission of cross-domain loads is responsible for *a lot* of 
> problems. Allowing sites to escape that would address a lot of problems, 
> even if it is opt-in. Eventually we could hope to reach a state where 
> all browsers support it, and most sites request it --- a much saner Web 
> IMHO.

Yup, by all means, it solves a lot of other problems - and devising a 
*comprehensive* solution (not a new specialty HTTP header to deal with 
IFRAMEs and OBJECT/EMBED/APPLETs specifically), even if opt-in, has the 
benefit of actually reducing complexity for web app developers (in terms 
of custom XSRF / script inclusion checks, etc, that they could ditch).

The issue is, a considerable implementation effort is involved in most of 
these comprehensive designs (given how current same-origin checks, and 
code taking cross-domain actions with no same-origin checks, is typically 
scattered), lots of open questions (e.g., there are some important 
performance trade-offs depending on the granularity of resources, the 
types of requests we want to run checks on; site-wide policies and per-URL 
policies; etc).

On top of that, there seem to be several incompatible proposals from 
various groups, with vendors seemingly not willing to back off. Microsoft 
is pursuing their proposal for cross-domain policies in MSIE8, Mozilla 
devs had another (and every other security researcher has probably their 
"own and better" design in the drawer, about to bring it out the moment 
they are asked for advice).

Bottom line is, I would be very surprised if such a functionality would be 
in a state that can be relied upon by web applications in the next 5-8 
years (more if the abysmally slow MSIE6 -> MSIE7 migration is bound to 
repeat with next major versions)... and I am not entirely comfortable with 
UI redress attacks being around for so long; I suppose most browser 
vendors are not happy too, given the recent / likely upcoming press 
attention.

Cheers,
/mz
Received on Saturday, 27 September 2008 04:41:06 UTC

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