W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webpayments@w3.org > December 2014

Re: P2P Payments

From: Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 18:22:09 +0100
Message-ID: <CAKaEYh+eKe57v8Kf5d-4OU_67Q=B2o6p97QzezM1zncha33-RQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
Cc: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, Web Payments <public-webpayments@w3.org>
On 5 December 2014 at 18:16, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 2014-12-05 17:38, Manu Sporny wrote:
> <snip>
>
>>
>> What Anders is pushing for is a device (like FIDO's U2F devices only w/o
>> the Same Origin Policy (SOP)) that you can use on any website to
>> digitally sign something (after typing in a PIN on the device to
>> complete the signature).
>>
>
> This is what Microsoft suggests:
> https://www.w3.org/2012/webcrypto/wiki/images/d/dd/CertAndKey_Management_
> Requirements_for_WebCrypto_microsoft.pdf
>
> Although the details are still very sketchy I don't see this as a viable
> solution,
> it looks like an orgy in security-GUIs, something which has a proven
> track-record to go wrong.
>
>
>  Typically, Secure Elements have been used for
>> this sort of activity. WebCrypto has no support for this right now,
>> although they're trying to figure out a way to make this happen at W3C.
>> Virginie Galindo, the chair of the WebCrypto group and Gemalto employee
>> (they make/sell Secure Elements), just presented to the Web
>> Payments IG User Payment Agent Task Force about this an hour ago.
>>
>
> Haven't the payment-card industry already had like 15 years figuring
> out how this should work?
>
> So what "Anders is pushing for" is something which *does not* directly
> expose keys (or other sensitive stuff) to "alien" sites:
>
> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-sysapps/2014Nov/0006.html
>
> Is this feasible?  I don't know for sure, I just thought that if an
> application
> installed locally is trusted to do certain things the same application
> (or a subset of it) ought to be [automatically] trusted even if supplied
> as a
> part of an untrusted piece of code provided that the platform can:
>
> 1) verify that the trusted code is authentic
>
> 2) protect the trusted code from intrusion by the untrusted code
>
> That is, the model for interaction is crucial thing.
>

Seems modern browser vendors are the enemy of decentralization.

But I still there are a lot of good folks working for browser vendors that
can be won over to the decentralization concept, if we make compelling
arguments.  I'd expect Mozilla to perhaps be the ones to lead the way here.

Is the same origin policy at least a switch that you can turn off, or is it
completely locked down?  Could we make a plugin to add this feature?


>
> Anders
>
>
>
>
>> -- manu
>>
>>
>
>
Received on Friday, 5 December 2014 17:22:37 UTC

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