- From: Andrew Miller <amiller@cs.umd.edu>
- Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 01:02:54 -0500
- To: David Schwartz <davidjoelschwartz@gmail.com>
- Cc: Web Payments CG <public-webpayments@w3.org>
> Everyone using the same list obviously works just fine. However, > surprisingly little overlap is needed and the network is still robust. For > example, we simulated with 1,000 validators, each picking 32 of the other > nodes randomly to use as a trust list. There were no problems whatsoever. We > then tried with each picking 12 other nodes randomly. Again, no problems > whatsoever. All these topologies result in everyone trying to come to an > agreement with everyone else. Can you elaborate a little on this? How many of the 1,000 validators to choose from were Sybils/malcious or otherwise adversarially controlled? Or what was the attack model? For comparison, in Bitcoin, there's a consensus style proof-sketch in Satoshi's whitepaper for when you assume half the hashpower is honest - the other half can be arbitrarily malicious and collusive. Since it's based on power rather than identities, sybil attacks aren't relevant. Rational modeling (i.e., under what conditions Bitcoin is incentive-compatible) is a more complex matter, but validators in Ripple aren't directly rewarded anyway so I'm happy deferring this till later. -- Andrew Miller
Received on Monday, 18 November 2013 06:03:25 UTC