W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webid@w3.org > October 2012

Re: privacy definitions -- was: WebID questions

From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2012 14:46:03 +0100
Message-ID: <CABrd9SRLRzQMf=Gd=LZ4Ptw2LWnzV+gUUCQbFovUwt108EH3Cg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
Cc: "Jonas Hogberg K.O" <jonas.k.o.hogberg@ericsson.com>, Carvalho Melvin <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>, "public-philoweb@w3.org" <public-philoweb@w3.org>, "public-webid@w3.org" <public-webid@w3.org>, Oshani Seneviratne <oshani@mit.edu>
On 1 October 2012 14:41, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>
> On 1 Oct 2012, at 15:36, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>
>> On 1 October 2012 14:07, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 1 Oct 2012, at 14:35, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 1 October 2012 13:20, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1 Oct 2012, at 13:43, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 30 September 2012 20:22, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 30 Sep 2012, at 20:46, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 30 September 2012 10:30, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 29 Sep 2012, at 19:50, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 28 September 2012 15:26, Jonas Hogberg K.O
>>>>>>>>>> <jonas.k.o.hogberg@ericsson.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> At
>>>>>>>>>>> http://blogs.kuppingercole.com/kearns/2012/09/25/in-search-of-privacy/?goback=.gde_3480266_member_168314336,
>>>>>>>>>>> Dave Kearns writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There is indeed a lot of confusion about the subject, but there are two key
>>>>>>>>>>> phrases to remember when talking about privacy:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Privacy is not anonymity
>>>>>>>>>>> Privacy is not secrecy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Quoting those out of context is not particularly helpful. But for more
>>>>>>>>>> on why anonymity is important for privacy...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.links.org/?p=123
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.links.org/?p=124
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Looking at those two, can we agree that we agree that anonymity should be the default?
>>>>>>>>> I believe as you do that when I go to a web site the default should be that I not be
>>>>>>>>> identified, and not be tracked. I can choose later to be tracked or identified for
>>>>>>>>> that site for a given amount of time or until I change my mind, but the default should
>>>>>>>>> be anonymity.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ( Within limits of logic of course. If I tell anonymous Y something P
>>>>>>>>> which has consequence Q, and some other anonymous Z does something with Q that would have
>>>>>>>>> been nearly impossible to know had they not known P, then I could conclude within
>>>>>>>>> a certain probability that  Y == Z )
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The web provides this. Some browsers provide it better than others, but really
>>>>>>>>> this is up to them. It is not perfect: ip addresses can be tracked and dns lookups
>>>>>>>>> can be tracked. But the web is not reliant on those. It could be deployed just as well
>>>>>>>>> on top of Tor. Had people had better memories, we could have had .onion urls plastered
>>>>>>>>> on bus stops since the beginning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Anonymity is important for many reasons. Among which is that it helps create a trusted
>>>>>>>>> public sphere. It increases my trust in the information I read if I know that the publisher
>>>>>>>>> publishes that information that can be read by anonymous readers. Knowing that the publisher
>>>>>>>>> cannot tell who is reading what he is publishing is a very strong guarantee that he
>>>>>>>>> is not adapting his message to different groups. Oddly enough anonymity has an important role
>>>>>>>>> therefore in public discussion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So do we agree here? I think we do.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So far.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ok. So let's see if we can agree further, from here :-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are a number of identification options available.
>>>>>>> Let me list some of them:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - anonymous ( 0 identification )
>>>>>>> - cookies   ( site bound )
>>>>>>> - TLS-Origin-Bound-Certificates ( unforgeable cookies )
>>>>>>> - Self-Signed certificates with an .onion WebID
>>>>>>>      ( I promised Appelbaum to work on that. This gives you an identity, but nobody knows
>>>>>>>        where you or your server are located )
>>>>>>> - Self-Signed certificates with a http(s) WebID
>>>>>>> - CA Signed Certificates
>>>>>>> - DNSSEC Signed Certificates
>>>>>>> - ...?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We agree that anonymous should be the default.
>>>>>>> I think we can agree as a matter of simple fact that none of the browsers show
>>>>>>> you which of those modes you are in when looking at a web page. You cannot
>>>>>>> as a user therefore tell if you are anonymous or not. You cannot therefore tell
>>>>>>> if the page you are looking at has been tweaked for you or if it would appear
>>>>>>> differently to someone else in the same mode as you. You cannot tell if the
>>>>>>> agent on the other side can tie you to a browsing history or not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well let me put this in a more nuanced way: you can tell the above from the
>>>>>>> side-effects - say if they should you your profile on a google+ page with edit mode
>>>>>>> allowed - but that is up to the server to show you that. We both want it to be
>>>>>>> up to the user. We don't want it to be up to the user in some complicated conf file
>>>>>>> hidden away somewhere. We both want it to be in your face, transparent. I should
>>>>>>> in an eyeblink be able to tell if I am anonymous or not, and I should be able
>>>>>>> to switch from one mode to the next if and when I want to in a simple easy gesture.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Just as in real life when we put on a mask we know that we are wearing the mask,
>>>>>>> so on the web we want to know what mask we are wearing at all times.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> These are the improvements I have been fighting ( not alone ) to get browsers to
>>>>>>> implement. Are we fighting on the same side here?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I agree that it is desirable to know how your browser is identifying
>>>>>> you and to be able to switch between users. So, I guess Chrome would
>>>>>> claim that the facility to have multiple users provides this. Do you
>>>>>> disagree?
>>>>>
>>>>> I looked up multiple Users and found this:
>>>>> http://support.google.com/chrome/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2364824
>>>>> I had not seen this before.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it seems to work for certificates. I created a new user Tester, and
>>>>> noticed the following as that Tester:
>>>>>
>>>>> 0. It did not have any of my bookmarks ( I suppose that's useful, cause your
>>>>>  bookmarks could identify you )
>>>>> 1. When I went to Google+ it did not know I was
>>>>> 2. Having signed in to https://my-profile.eu/ as the old user, I tried as the
>>>>>   new user Tester, and had to select a certificate again. Good.
>>>>>
>>>>> So that seems like one way to separate one's personalities. I'd still like to
>>>>> have the url bar show me for each tab:
>>>>>
>>>>> [anonymous] when I am not logged in
>>>>> [cookie] when I am tracked on that site
>>>>> [henry story] for a local site identity
>>>>> [bblfish@home] when I am using a certificate
>>>>>
>>>>> With the option of logging out from that site (ie checking x -> anonymous ). Because
>>>>> currently I could forget that I had chosen a certificate on a site, and it
>>>>> would continue sending it. Or I could mistakenly choose a certificate as one user,
>>>>> and then decide that was the wrong user for that persona, and not be able to choose
>>>>> the certificate again, without closing my browser completely. That would allow, on
>>>>> browser startup, the browser to remember the last identity choice for a site. Without
>>>>> logout capability that is not possible, because then it would be impossible to repair
>>>>> an identity mistake without creating a new user. (And it makes testing tedious).
>>>>>
>>>>> Currently when I close my browser, on restart the servers ask me for my certificate again.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it looks like this is going generally in the right direction. It still does not provide
>>>>> the transparency we are looking for at the UI level above. But thanks for pointing this out.
>>>>>
>>>>> So I think we agree that what is missing is the transparency at the UI level of which identity
>>>>> one is using at each site. That is what I was hoping the following bug report would achieve.
>>>>>
>>>>> http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=29784
>>>>>
>>>>> So perhaps by putting this forward under the term transparency, that would help that bug report
>>>>> progress, since otherwise they could thing that the issue had already been completely solved.
>>>>>
>>>>> So that's what I make of that. But have I missed something? Or do we agree there too?
>>>>
>>>> I don't think so
>>>> . As I said, I think that Chrome would claim that the
>>>> users facility provides everything you need - if you want to know
>>>> which cert you're using, then have a user per cert. As for cookies and
>>>> "local site identities", this would require information the browser
>>>> does not currently have, so I think you would first have to explain
>>>> how it is going to get that information.
>>>
>>> Well the browser knows when it sends a cookie. So showing a [cookie]
>>> icon would be easy there. When you are in anonymous mode it does not
>>> send a cookie. (perhaps a no-cookie/cert icon - would be more precise)
>>> As for per site identity that is what the Mozilla folks were working
>>> with Aza Raskin
>>>
>>> http://www.azarask.in/blog/post/identity-in-the-browser-firefox/
>>>
>>> But until a standard is agree to there, one could already have
>>> a [cookie] icon...
>>
>> Sure, but it would be pretty pointless: I just checked and every
>> single tab I have open has some cookies associated.
>
> So perhaps then only show anonymous when no cookie is there.
>
>>
>>>> For anonymous, Chrome already has an anonymous mode (though note that
>>>> you don't really stay anonymous for long once you enter it, since it
>>>> must still use cookies or the 'net stops working - also bookmarks are
>>>> still available in anon mode).
>>>
>>> As above the browser knows when it sends cookies: and so it can show
>>> the user that it is doing that.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I believe that Chrome experimented with per-tab personas and found
>>>> that it was a terrible user experience, btw.
>>>
>>> It does not look that bad in Aza Raskin's proposal, and the Account
>>> Manager work at Mozilla
>>>
>>> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Labs/Weave/Identity/Account_Manager
>>>
>>> My guess is that the project to create the multiple user work
>>> at Chrome trumped the development of good identity transparency
>>> solutions. That often happens in engineering: one good idea
>>> hides another one for a while.
>>
>> Or, as I said, it turns out to not work very well. That happens even
>> more often, and apparently has happened in this case. Saying it
>> doesn't look that bad to you doesn't change it!
>
> Look if we are serious thinkers we first select our principles and
> then we search for a solution. It may be that we have not found the
> solution, yet. But since we have established an important principle of
> transparency, we keep looking until we find the solution. I am
> not dictating the solution. I am saying we agreed on a principle,
> so it is now a question of solving it in good will.
>
>>
>>> In any case there is a lack of transparency in the multiple user
>>> set up that still needs to be rectified. How that is done I'll leave
>>> to UI experts. But I'll recognise a good solution whatever form it
>>> takes.
>>>
>>> Now here with WebID we are assuming such a solution will be found
>>> by one of the browser vendors in good time, and then adopted by the
>>> others. The current interface  we can agree is not good enough for
>>> sure, but the problems we are trying to  solve are  important enough
>>> that we can work with the current limitations of browser.
>>
>> Who is the "we" that can agree it? And why is it not good enough? You
>> have not explained that at all.
>
> I did explain it. But it must have gotten lost in some threads.
> I'll start a new thread on that.

Specifically, I am asking why the users facility that Chrome has is
not good enough...

>
>>
>>> That leaves us with the importance of cross site identity. I think
>>> I have a very powerful argument in favour of its importance. It is
>>> important for a certain kind of privacy to be possible: that between
>>> two people or groups of people wishing to exchange documents that
>>> should only be visible to certain people and no others. This is the
>>> case when someone wishes to discuss something with a doctor, or when
>>> someone wishes to publish photos of people at a party without making
>>> it fully public, and in many many other circumstances.  It is important
>>> for creating a distributed social network, which I will call the
>>> Social Web.  The Web and the internet have always been about distribution
>>> and decentralisation of information. We want to do that using WebID in
>>> a manner that increases privacy. I will be working on showing how
>>> this can be done on the Web, and on the Web running over Tor.
>>>
>>> Henry
>>>
>>> Social Web Architect
>>> http://bblfish.net/
>>>
>
> Social Web Architect
> http://bblfish.net/
>
Received on Monday, 1 October 2012 14:00:33 UTC

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