- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:02:11 -0800
- To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
- Cc: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAEnTvdC_wBSWKUghkLJLCkQBn0W2kFz985Gc-0AwL+wYALvyGw@mail.gmail.com>
I filed https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=24765
...Mark
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 8:06 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 10:47 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Feb 21, 2014 7:25 AM, "Richard Barnes" <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>> >
>> > For generation: Can't the JS truncate the MAC after it gets the full
>> result back?
>> >
>> > For verification: I'm wary of having the API accept arbitrarily short
>> MACs. You would need to specify acceptable lengths in order to avoid
>> things like an 8-bit MAC being accepted. Is there standard practice /
>> documentation for these lengths?
>> >
>>
>> Richard,
>>
>> Is this the same concern you express regarding defaults? That is, that
>> you want the API to be more high-level than it is?
>>
>> I didn't mean it that way, but rather as trying to keep tag lengths out
> of the API.
>
>
>> We already support arbitrary GCM tag lengths, I'm inclined to agree with
>> Jim that we should keep parity with that (and HMAC).
>>
> My concern is really just about the semantics of "verify" being clear,
> which would apply equally well to GCM ("decrypt"). If we're going to allow
> arbitrary tag lengths, then we should probably put a note in the security
> considerations that developers need to check that the tags are sufficiently
> long.
>
>
>> Disallowing this just encourages developers to do truncation and
>> verification themselves, in non-constant time.
>>
> Truncation doesn't seem like a risk, but I can see your point w.r.t.
> verification.
>
> Could we set a minimum tag length, say 64 bits? Is there really a use
> case below that?
>
> --Richard
>
>
> >
>> > On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 10:55 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Starting with the editorial note in section 18.12.1 - I would be a
>> strong advocate that MAC lengths other than 128 should be supported by the
>> algorithm. There is a section of the security community (no comment as it
>> the correctness of its view) that states that security is increased by
>> truncating the MAC from 128 to 96 bits. This is a feature that people will
>> want supported.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Jim
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>>
>
>
Received on Friday, 21 February 2014 17:02:40 UTC