- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:02:11 -0800
- To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
- Cc: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAEnTvdC_wBSWKUghkLJLCkQBn0W2kFz985Gc-0AwL+wYALvyGw@mail.gmail.com>
I filed https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=24765 ...Mark On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 8:06 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 10:47 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote: > >> >> On Feb 21, 2014 7:25 AM, "Richard Barnes" <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote: >> > >> > For generation: Can't the JS truncate the MAC after it gets the full >> result back? >> > >> > For verification: I'm wary of having the API accept arbitrarily short >> MACs. You would need to specify acceptable lengths in order to avoid >> things like an 8-bit MAC being accepted. Is there standard practice / >> documentation for these lengths? >> > >> >> Richard, >> >> Is this the same concern you express regarding defaults? That is, that >> you want the API to be more high-level than it is? >> >> I didn't mean it that way, but rather as trying to keep tag lengths out > of the API. > > >> We already support arbitrary GCM tag lengths, I'm inclined to agree with >> Jim that we should keep parity with that (and HMAC). >> > My concern is really just about the semantics of "verify" being clear, > which would apply equally well to GCM ("decrypt"). If we're going to allow > arbitrary tag lengths, then we should probably put a note in the security > considerations that developers need to check that the tags are sufficiently > long. > > >> Disallowing this just encourages developers to do truncation and >> verification themselves, in non-constant time. >> > Truncation doesn't seem like a risk, but I can see your point w.r.t. > verification. > > Could we set a minimum tag length, say 64 bits? Is there really a use > case below that? > > --Richard > > > > >> > On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 10:55 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> Starting with the editorial note in section 18.12.1 - I would be a >> strong advocate that MAC lengths other than 128 should be supported by the >> algorithm. There is a section of the security community (no comment as it >> the correctness of its view) that states that security is increased by >> truncating the MAC from 128 to 96 bits. This is a feature that people will >> want supported. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Jim >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >
Received on Friday, 21 February 2014 17:02:40 UTC