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RE: ECC vs RSA, and Similar Conflicts

From: Da Cruz Pinto, Juan M <juan.m.da.cruz.pinto@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 19:37:33 +0000
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com>, Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
Message-ID: <0A38A08BA24AFC4383E156B62EB0279015AEBEAB@FMSMSX107.amr.corp.intel.com>
That's correct. HSM vendors do provide custom APIs that behave like PKCS#11 modules (but do not comply to the PKCS#11 standard) for more current protocols. 


-----Original Message-----
From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@rtfm.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2012 16:12
To: Da Cruz Pinto, Juan M
Cc: David McGrew; Richard L. Barnes; Anil Saldhana; public-webcrypto@w3.org
Subject: Re: ECC vs RSA, and Similar Conflicts

On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Da Cruz Pinto, Juan M <juan.m.da.cruz.pinto@intel.com> wrote:
> Keep in mind that PKCS#11 defines an API for accessing crypto operations, one which does not require the caller to have direct access to key material. For instance, most HSM (Hardware Security Modules) vendors provide a PKCS#11 library for developers to integrate with.
> This means that if you are using a PKCS#11 module, then you don't really need to have safe/unsafe sections of the API when using ,e.g., RSA. Moreover, if you are using a smartcard thru a PKCS#11 module, then you most probably will not be able to access the key material at all.

This is only true because PKCS #11 has been adjusted to provide a number of specialized pieces of keying material manipulation as required by current protocols.
If, for instance, I decided to invent a new KDF for use with DH (as SSL/TLS did) I would not be able to use it with existing PKCS #11.

Received on Thursday, 31 May 2012 12:22:58 UTC

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