W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webcrypto@w3.org > May 2012

Re: ECC vs RSA, and Similar Conflicts

From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 12:11:36 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBO+3tKHfS=vzbHusOVGFHvJBCS5FMUMWnJgD82H=gMQCw@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Da Cruz Pinto, Juan M" <juan.m.da.cruz.pinto@intel.com>
Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com>, Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Da Cruz Pinto, Juan M
<juan.m.da.cruz.pinto@intel.com> wrote:
> Keep in mind that PKCS#11 defines an API for accessing crypto operations, one which does not require the caller to have direct access to key material. For instance, most HSM (Hardware Security Modules) vendors provide a PKCS#11 library for developers to integrate with.
> This means that if you are using a PKCS#11 module, then you don't really need to have safe/unsafe sections of the API when using ,e.g., RSA. Moreover, if you are using a smartcard thru a PKCS#11 module, then you most probably will not be able to access the key material at all.

This is only true because PKCS #11 has been adjusted to provide a number of
specialized pieces of keying material manipulation as required by
current protocols.
If, for instance, I decided to invent a new KDF for use with DH (as SSL/TLS did)
I would not be able to use it with existing PKCS #11.

Received on Wednesday, 30 May 2012 19:12:45 UTC

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