Re: crypto-ISSUE-30 (where is the key ?): How does the application know where the key is stored ? [Web Cryptography API]

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 11:03 AM, Seetharama Rao Durbha
<> wrote:
> On 8/29/12 11:35 AM, "Ryan Sleevi" <> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Lu HongQian Karen
> <> wrote:
> Hi Ryan,
> I agree with you that Issue-30 needs more elaboration.
> Regarding to keylocation, I was thinking
> Enum keyLocation {
>    None, // unspecified
>    Browser, // browser's storage
>    Local, // local storage other than browser's
>    CryptoProvider // complexity: a user agent may have more than one
> cryptoProviders
> };
> The distinction between "Local" and "CryptoProvider" is fundamentally
> flawed in assuming an implementation detail - since an implementation
> may access "Local" (which I assume to mean 'OS storage', but in fact
> can mean much more) storage via CryptoProviders.
> In fact, all Browser storage is could simply be another CryptoProvider.
> Note that the reason we are down this path is so that the application can
> limit the keys it wants the user to select.

And that's where the breakdown in communication is happening.

The premise of a user selecting something is related to
querying/discovery, not provisioning. Further, this isn't the only
reason we're down this path - it has been expressly commented and
described by Karen that this distinction is for web applications to
make trust decisions -

As discussed elsewhere, the notion of "provisioning", as has been used
in the discussion of "pre-provisioned keys", is meaning that all the
information is already provided, and there is nothing for the user TO

The moment you talk about "the user selecting" something, this goes into
1) Key discovery
2) User interface experience to support key discovery

We're not there yet. We're a rather long way away from that, in fact,
because of the security/usability concerns, let alone the
implementation details.

Received on Wednesday, 29 August 2012 18:18:33 UTC