- From: Mountie Lee <mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr>
- Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2012 13:59:36 +0900
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Cc: Web Cryptography Working Group <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, David Dahl <ddahl@mozilla.com>, Vijay Bharadwaj <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com>
- Message-ID: <CAE-+aYLVzW2OnVt6se8EJNY8nCWZRnEsG9FR2m2rus+euhFj_g@mail.gmail.com>
Hi. for determining key expiration, are CRL or OCSP in scope of low level api? regards mountie. On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 1:53 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 5, 2012 at 9:46 PM, Web Cryptography Working Group Issue > Tracker <sysbot+tracker@w3.org> wrote: > > crypto-ISSUE-16: Definition for Key Expiration [Web Cryptography API] > > > > http://www.w3.org/2012/webcrypto/track/issues/16 > > > > Raised by: Ryan Sleevi > > On product: Web Cryptography API > > > > During the July Face-to-Face, the topic of Key Expiration was raised. > However, a solid definition is lacking for what the semantics should be. > > > > Argument for Implementation Semantics: > > - Expiration could serve as a quota-management technique. Keys may > represent expensive resources, particularly in constrained environments. > Therefore, an understanding of how long a key is supposed to live may allow > a user agent to remove 'expired' keys over time. > > > > Argument for Application Semantics: > > - Expiration should have no specific meaning to the implementation; it > is simply provided to the application in an advisory capability to inform > the application how a key can/should be used. This is particularly > important for implementations that use pre-existing cryptographic APIs, > such as OS APIs, as the underlying API may enforce these semantics. An > example was given for a keypair where the private key may no longer be able > to sign messages after a particular date, but the associated public key may > be used to verify existing messages. > > > > Should expiration be handled on a per-application basis in the custom > attributes, or is it a global attribute on all Key types that should be > managed by the User Agent? > > > > > > > > David, you initially scoped key expiration, so I was hoping you could > explain a bit more of the use case and how you see it working. > > Vijay, you provided the example of a key that can no longer be used > for signing, so I was hoping you could explain a bit more. > > > While it is "easy" to say that expiration info reflects whatever is in > the associated certificate, it's not a guarantee that there will even > BE an associated certificate (eg: crypto-ISSUE-15, symmetric keys, > ephemeral key pairs). It's also not clear what the validity period > would be if the user has two certificates with either overlapping > times (is it the union of the two validity periods?) or > non-overlapping times (is it the min max? Whichever period is current > for Now? Something else?) > > I will note that PKCS#11 (Linux/Mozilla) exposes this information via > CKA_START_DATE and CKA_END_DATE on Key objects, as optional, > non-normative parameters. Similarly, CSSM_KEYHEADER (OS X) defines > startDate and endDate as the effective dates of the keys. I didn't see > anything equivalent in CryptoAPI or CNG (under Key Storage Property > Identifiers), however, so I'm not sure how universal this concept is. > > ======================================= PayGate Inc. THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
Received on Wednesday, 8 August 2012 22:23:48 UTC