- From: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>
- Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 10:55:40 +0200
- To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Cc: Artur Janc <aaj@google.com>, Alex Russell <slightlyoff@google.com>, Emily Stark <estark@google.com>, Jonathan Watt <jwatt@mozilla.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 10:39 AM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > Filed https://github.com/WICG/isolation/issues/12 to discuss, as I'd prefer > that approach to increasing the complexity of the `WindowProxy` checks > themselves. Sounds reasonable. Now, what happens when an isolated document messages with a same-origin document that is not isolated? Is that a risk we care about? If you have a capability-based security model you might hand around ports and assign authority to those ports. However, if these ports are introduced in your system through non-trustworthy pages (per the "people make mistakes" bit of the threat model), is that something we want to protect against? (Could also be a BroadcastChannel that starts emitting propaganda or some such.) -- https://annevankesteren.nl/
Received on Friday, 28 April 2017 08:56:10 UTC