W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > April 2017

Re: Breaking the `opener` relationship.

From: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 10:55:40 +0200
Message-ID: <CADnb78j+tmc6+1Jqo+ybgtKpok9hjrqxo4V9qbpHc1zAyQ3pHg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Cc: Artur Janc <aaj@google.com>, Alex Russell <slightlyoff@google.com>, Emily Stark <estark@google.com>, Jonathan Watt <jwatt@mozilla.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 10:39 AM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:
> Filed https://github.com/WICG/isolation/issues/12 to discuss, as I'd prefer
> that approach to increasing the complexity of the `WindowProxy` checks
> themselves.

Sounds reasonable.

Now, what happens when an isolated document messages with a
same-origin document that is not isolated? Is that a risk we care
about? If you have a capability-based security model you might hand
around ports and assign authority to those ports. However, if these
ports are introduced in your system through non-trustworthy pages (per
the "people make mistakes" bit of the threat model), is that something
we want to protect against? (Could also be a BroadcastChannel that
starts emitting propaganda or some such.)

Received on Friday, 28 April 2017 08:56:10 UTC

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