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Re: Verified Javascript: Proposal

From: Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 19:16:29 +0200
Message-ID: <CAL14OeFSq533goeO05h_6cGoYL3is_ksEnkggJX-q-GgTLCPWg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@google.com>
Cc: Eduardo Robles Elvira <edulix@nvotes.com>, public-webappsec <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>
Forgot [1]: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Desktop/issues/871

2017-04-26 19:12 GMT+02:00 Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@gmail.com>:
> 2017-04-26 17:36 GMT+02:00 Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@google.com>:
>> Daniel's asking to build HCS into browsers, which means he's asking lots of
>> other people to do work for him. We have to decide whether the potential
>> benefit is worth that work, and if it's only appropriate for very few use
>> cases, it's probably not worth it.
> I agree. I think there is probably not an abundance of web apps that
> will use HCS, but I think that the ones that will will be high-value
> web apps, such as E2E messaging apps (as Brad brought up), encrypted
> storage, Bitcoin clients, things like that. More importantly, HCS will
> allow *new* web apps like that to be created, that simply wouldn't be
> secure today. Here's a discussion about that regarding Signal Desktop
> [1], with metromoxie (ex-Google Chrome Security team) specifically
> saying he wants a feature like this.
> The other category of apps that would benefit from HCS are ones that
> don't particularly have anything to do with encryption, but also don't
> trust the server, for example by being completely client-side.
>> Now, HCS is not the only way to achieve its goals. Brad Hill proposed
>> another way, that would likely work for more kinds of sites,
> I disagree. I think for a large web application, requiring Subresource
> Integrity for every resource is unmaintainable, and disallowing
> eval(), inline event handlers, and more, is restricting. What if you
> have a Web Worker, referenced by a script, referenced by an iframe,
> etc? Ignoring the fact that Subresource Integrity for Web Workers and
> iframes doesn't exist yet. Having an external list of resources and
> hashes, be it in the certificate or an external file, is much easier.
>> and even Brad's proposal might not be the best option.
>> We should follow the WHATWG's proposal process, described at
>> https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/FAQ#Is_there_a_process_for_adding_new_features_to_a_specification.3F:
>> describe the threat model that we want a defense against, and the kinds of
>> infrastructure that should be able to deploy the solution, and then look for
>> defenses against those threats that can be deployed by those kinds of
>> infrastructure.
>> The https://github.com/twiss/hcs repository would be a good place to start
>> that requirements document if you're interested in pursuing it, or Brad
>> might already have a document started somewhere else.
> Sure. I've started with a list of attacks I want a defense against here:
> https://github.com/twiss/hcs/blob/master/threat-model
>> Jeffrey
Received on Wednesday, 26 April 2017 17:17:22 UTC

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