- From: Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>
- Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 11:49:03 -0500
- To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@mozilla.com>
- Cc: Eric Mill <eric@konklone.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <569E68FF.9090205@owasp.org>
I am just looking for (or am considering creating if none exists) a test to see how browsers handle HSTS and mixed content decisions. I just want to understand current behavior today access all browser that support HSTS. - Jim On 1/19/16 11:46 AM, Richard Barnes wrote: > Which "this" do you mean? If you mean "taking HSTS into account for > MIX decisions", then you're not going to get much, since AFAIK no > browser has implemented it yet. > > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:00 AM, Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org > <mailto:jim.manico@owasp.org>> wrote: > > Does anyone have an online test for this? I think understand and > standardizing this behavior is important. > > - Jim > > > On 1/18/16 3:11 PM, Eric Mill wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 7:11 AM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com >> <mailto:mkwst@google.com>> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com >> <mailto:jim@manicode.com>> wrote: >> >> Forgive this indulgence, but does HSTS preloading have >> the same benefits of HSTS priming since preloaded HSTS >> would occur before the mixed content check? >> >> >> Yes. Basically, we'd only do a priming ping if the origin >> being requested wasn't already marked as HSTSized in the >> user's local browser. The fact that we _would_ do a priming >> ping for non-secure origins that aren't in the local >> browser's HSTS list ensures that we can do the upgrade >> without breakage. >> >> >> I may be remembering wrong, but I didn't think HSTS alone >> (preloaded or dynamic) would resolve mixed content issues. >> >> The stated concern with allowing HSTS to affect mixed-content >> rendering is that it would create different experiences >> per-user/session, and preloading does mitigate this concern, but >> I didn't think there was an actual code path in Chrome (or other >> browsers) where it decides to allow HSTS to override mixed >> content if the HSTS policy was preloaded. >> >> -- Eric > >
Received on Tuesday, 19 January 2016 16:49:34 UTC