W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > January 2016

Re: HSTS priming vs preloading

From: Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 11:49:03 -0500
To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@mozilla.com>
Cc: Eric Mill <eric@konklone.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Message-ID: <569E68FF.9090205@owasp.org>
I am just looking for (or am considering creating if none exists) a test 
to see how browsers handle HSTS and mixed content decisions. I just want 
to understand current behavior today access all browser that support HSTS.

- Jim

On 1/19/16 11:46 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Which "this" do you mean?  If you mean "taking HSTS into account for 
> MIX decisions", then you're not going to get much, since AFAIK no 
> browser has implemented it yet.
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:00 AM, Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org 
> <mailto:jim.manico@owasp.org>> wrote:
>     Does anyone have an online test for this? I think understand and
>     standardizing this behavior is important.
>     - Jim
>     On 1/18/16 3:11 PM, Eric Mill wrote:
>>     On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 7:11 AM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com
>>     <mailto:mkwst@google.com>> wrote:
>>         On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com
>>         <mailto:jim@manicode.com>> wrote:
>>             Forgive this indulgence, but does HSTS preloading have
>>             the same benefits of HSTS priming since preloaded HSTS
>>             would occur before the mixed content check?
>>         Yes. Basically, we'd only do a priming ping if the origin
>>         being requested wasn't already marked as HSTSized in the
>>         user's local browser. The fact that we _would_ do a priming
>>         ping for non-secure origins that aren't in the local
>>         browser's HSTS list ensures that we can do the upgrade
>>         without breakage.
>>     I may be remembering wrong, but I didn't think HSTS alone
>>     (preloaded or dynamic) would resolve mixed content issues.
>>     The stated concern with allowing HSTS to affect mixed-content
>>     rendering is that it would create different experiences
>>     per-user/session, and preloading does mitigate this concern, but
>>     I didn't think there was an actual code path in Chrome (or other
>>     browsers) where it decides to allow HSTS to override mixed
>>     content if the HSTS policy was preloaded.
>>     -- Eric
Received on Tuesday, 19 January 2016 16:49:34 UTC

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