Re: [MIX] Carveout for `127.0.0.1`?

On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 10:27 AM, Eduardo' Vela" <Nava> <evn@google.com>
wrote:

> Yes please!
>
I'm not sure if you're supportive because it's a good idea, or because it
will let you break more things. :)


> On Fri, Apr 29, 2016, 09:46 Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Currently, mixed content checks block `http://127.0.0.1` from loading in
>> a page delivered over TLS. I'm (belatedly) coming around to the idea that
>> that restriction does more harm than good. In particular, I'll note that
>> folks are installing new trusted roots and self-signing certs for that IP
>> address, exposing themselves to additional risk for minimal benefit.
>> Helpful locally installed software is doing the same, with even more
>> associated risk.
>>
>> I'd like to change MIX to use the Secure Contexts spec's notion of
>> "potentially trustworthy" origins as opposed to toggling strictly based on
>> the URL's protocol. This would be a normative change that would force us
>> back to CR again. *shrug* Seems like it might be worth doing anyway.
>>
>> I've filed https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-mixed-content/issues/4 to
>> cover this, and have a PR up at
>> https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-mixed-content/pull/5 for discussion.
>>
>> WDYT?
>>
>
Note also that I'm thinking about this in the context of
https://mikewest.github.io/cors-rfc1918/, which aims to create more
restrictions on Internet -> Intranet -> Local traffic that are probably
more reasonable. That's going to be tough to ship, but I'm aiming to have a
prototype for discussion at our May F2F.

-mike