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Re: HSTS Priming, continued.

From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 12:09:43 -0800
Message-ID: <CABkgnnU74JMG9AuQ9kyPOP7h-k5gSmnZML6ificX1+kgdRHWSQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@microsoft.com>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@mozilla.com>, Jeff Hodges <jeff.hodges@paypal.com>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A concern that has come up in the past is the fact that this would
generate extra - and perhaps unwanted - load on servers.  I don't give
that much credibility, but it has been why we couldn't probe in the

On 11 November 2015 at 11:38, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
> Crispin Cowan <crispin@microsoft.com> wrote:
>> Dumb/newbie question: wouldn’t HTTPS upgrades be easy if only client
>> browsers tried HTTPS first for every resource? Then fail back to HTTP if
>> policy allows, or block if policy disallows mixed content.
> I agree that this sounds better to me. In particular, before doing a
> mixed-content subresource load, first try the subresource load over
> https://. If the response has the HSTS header then you are golden.
> Otherwise, if the response is a 2xx without HSTS (but with the expected
> content-type--no sniffing), then it's probably better to just use the HTTPS
> response anyway; it might be the wrong response, but it's probably not going
> to be much worse than the lack of a response that mixed content blocking
> causes. Otherwise, if it is <img>, <video>, <audio>, continue on with the
> mixed content load if you feel like it.
> K.I.S.S.
> Cheers,
> Brian
> --
> https://briansmith.org/
Received on Wednesday, 11 November 2015 20:10:11 UTC

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