- From: Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>
- Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:14:23 +0000
- To: Conrad Irwin <conrad.irwin@gmail.com>
- Cc: Ahmed Saleh <ahmedzs@live.ca>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAHQV2Kk55O_=Lj4VU4MHVaabwu_fCpYzi86L1UQMeCnbYuyi-g@mail.gmail.com>
A pointer in which direction? I assume you mean from CSP to SRI (since SRI points to CSP)? That may happen eventually, but keep in mind that SRI isn't a finalized spec yet. -Joel On Thu, Jul 30, 2015, 7:43 AM Conrad Irwin <conrad.irwin@gmail.com> wrote: > Thanks for the pointer. I joined the list to suggest implementing > subresource integrity as part of the Content-Security-Policy, because it > seemed like an obviously missing piece. > > I don't know what the usual way of handling this is, but a pointer between > the two documents would have helped significantly. > > Conrad > > > On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 11:45 PM, Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> For your suggestion of the server sending hashes to the client, a variant >> of this is actually under design right now. See Subresource Integrity >> <http://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/> (and the many discussions on this list about >> it). >> >> For the client to server hash, this is unlikely to be implemented, for >> several reasons: >> >> - As described, the application could lie to the server, so there >> would be no benefit. A "bad" browser could run Chrome, get the hash it >> sends, copy that hash, and start sending it to the server as if it was its >> own. >> - Even if some version were to be implemented (using TPMs, for >> example, or even just OS level constructs), this would almost certainly be >> a violation of the Priority of Constituencies >> <http://www.schemehostport.com/2011/10/priority-of-constituencies.html>. >> What you've described is a form of remote attestation >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing#Remote_attestation>, >> which generally has been rejected on the Web (with notable exceptions >> surrounding DRM). Basically, a user agent *should* be allowed to lie. >> In fact, this is how in browser compatibility traditionally has worked, and >> why every user agent string has the words "Mozilla" and "IE" in it. >> >> --Joel >> >> On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 3:29 PM Ahmed Saleh <ahmedzs@live.ca> wrote: >> >>> Hi Sir/Madam, >>> It would be a nice feature if we can exchange hashes between server and >>> browser. a client as a browser would send clients' browser hash signature >>> and the server would send it's application hash signature. This way, as a >>> client, I would insure that I am communicating to the right version of >>> application I intend (in case if this application is open source) and as a >>> server, the server would insure that it's communicating to the right >>> clients' browser as intended(that for example, could protect and view my >>> data). >>> Thank you, >>> >>> >
Received on Thursday, 30 July 2015 16:15:05 UTC