Re: CfC to publish FPWD of "Upgrade Insecure Resources"; Deadline Feb 17th.

On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com> wrote:
> What if the HTTP non-same origin data is optionally-blockable content?  The
> same-origin content will get upgraded and mixed passive /
> optionally-blockable HTTP content from other origins will get loaded.

As we've discussed in other threads, I think user agents can and
should experiment with automagically upgrading insecure blockable
content, quite apart from whatever behavior we allow sites to
opt-into. Those pages are already broken, so breaking them in a
different way isn't particularly risky.

Depending on user agents' experience with such experiments, it would
make a great addition to MIX2, whenever we get around to that. ;)

> cookies associated with the origin won't get exposed since the same-origin
> requests have been updated and the content that is loaded can't use
> document.cookie.

I don't see how that follows. Cookies don't respect the origin model,
meaning that a request for an image at
`http://subdomain.example.com/image.png` will happily send along
cookies set by `https://example.com/` unless the latter origin takes
specific steps to prevent that (by, for example, setting the `secure`
and `domain` flags). Since it seems integral to the migration strategy
Peter and others have proposed that both HTTP and HTTPS versions of a
site be available for some transitional period, it's not clear that
origins can easily mitigate this risk.

-mike

--
Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest

Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany,
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der
Gesellschaft: Hamburg, Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine
Elizabeth Flores
(Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)

Received on Wednesday, 11 February 2015 13:26:06 UTC