- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 14:25:18 +0100
- To: Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com>
- Cc: Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>, Crispin Cowan <crispin@microsoft.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, yan zhu <yan@mit.edu>
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com> wrote: > What if the HTTP non-same origin data is optionally-blockable content? The > same-origin content will get upgraded and mixed passive / > optionally-blockable HTTP content from other origins will get loaded. As we've discussed in other threads, I think user agents can and should experiment with automagically upgrading insecure blockable content, quite apart from whatever behavior we allow sites to opt-into. Those pages are already broken, so breaking them in a different way isn't particularly risky. Depending on user agents' experience with such experiments, it would make a great addition to MIX2, whenever we get around to that. ;) > cookies associated with the origin won't get exposed since the same-origin > requests have been updated and the content that is loaded can't use > document.cookie. I don't see how that follows. Cookies don't respect the origin model, meaning that a request for an image at `http://subdomain.example.com/image.png` will happily send along cookies set by `https://example.com/` unless the latter origin takes specific steps to prevent that (by, for example, setting the `secure` and `domain` flags). Since it seems integral to the migration strategy Peter and others have proposed that both HTTP and HTTPS versions of a site be available for some transitional period, it's not clear that origins can easily mitigate this risk. -mike -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany, Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg, Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)
Received on Wednesday, 11 February 2015 13:26:06 UTC