W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > February 2015

Re: WebAppSec re-charter status

From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 23:35:33 -0800
Message-ID: <CAPfop_36W7UMvjm5y_cJiXMfj0DxLeXtAu321XO8UCuHeF2SJw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Deian Stefan <deian@cs.stanford.edu>
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@google.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, David Ross <drx@google.com>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@google.com>, David Baron <dbaron@dbaron.org>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
hmm .. maybe we are talking across each other --- so does the
requirement spec'ing that browsers implement the logic for DC (or
DIFC) labels?

I would rather that browsers do the confinement and allow webapp
JavaScript code to do interposition and implement whatever label /
flow system it desires. Your last email suggests that you also want
the same. If the proposal only about implementing confinement and
interposition, that sounds good to me (although, I share Mike's
concerns about side channels).


On 8 February 2015 at 23:17, Deian Stefan <deian@cs.stanford.edu> wrote:
> Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com> writes:
>> I think asking browsers to implement any distributed information flow
>> system is a big ask and to make it a deliverable for this WG an even
>> bigger ask. I think creating confined containers (workers or iframes)
>> that then allow some JS script to create simple information flow based
>> policies is a simpler first step and a more concrete deliverable. Note
>> that this in itself is not easy and it is not clear it can even be
>> done---see Martin's notes about side-channels.
> Sorry, but "confined containers (workers or iframes) that ... allow some
> JS script to create simple information flow based policies" is
> essentially what the goal of the COWL spec is.
> I agree that side channels are a concern if you consider malicious code,
> but confining code that is not malicious is still useful. And COWL's
> covert-channel assumption is the same as that of the existing CSP
> directives that deal with exfiltration. I don't think we need to
> eliminate covert channels to improve security.
> Cheers,
> Deian
Received on Monday, 9 February 2015 07:36:21 UTC

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