Regardless of how HSTS and mixed content interact, the problem Anne
describes can still exist on an http non-HSTS page. The http page can
embed <img src=http://hsts-target.example/ onload=visited()
onerror=notvisited()> and Mixed Content Blocker would never be invoked
to prevent the http page from discovering whether the user has visited
the target page.
On 9/26/14 5:26 AM, Mike West wrote:
> +sleevi
>
> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl
> <mailto:annevk@annevk.nl>> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com
> <mailto:mkwst@google.com>> wrote:
> > Yes, I think that's true.
>
> Perhaps Gecko's stance that HSTS rewriting happens after Mixed Content
> is correct. At least for non-same-origin HSTS. :-(
>
>
> That's how Chrome implements it, actually. Ryan, et al, are dead-set
> against moving HSTS before mixed content checking, as he claims
> (correctly) that HSTS only protects those browsers that support it. If
> we don't throw errors, we're throwing Safari and IE users under a bus.
>
> -mike
>