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Re: [Integrity] Some comments on Cross-Origin leakage and content types

From: Ángel González <angel@16bits.net>
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 20:38:33 +0200
Message-ID: <1411670313.1007.3.camel@16bits.net>
To: public-webappsec@w3.org
Devdatta Akhawe wrote:
> Aah -- so are you saying that
> 
> When bank.com uses SRI to fetch same origin resource with integrity
> meta data, it shouldn't happen that tomorrow attacker.com should be
> able to bruteforce the value because it is already in the
> integrity-based cache? I don't think thats the intent of the spec, but
> before I get into that; can you confirm this is your concern?

I think he means that attacker.com shouldn't be able to discover if he
is a bank.com customer or not.

That's the 
> 4.1 Caching Risks should document the privacy risk (history reading)
> of loading by hash a resource used on a specific site.
I reported last week.

OTOH if he is going to use timing, I think it is already possible to
check that way if it's in the cache or not. IMHO there's a bigger issue
if it implements the hash-as-cache-keys, as then there is no timing
involved: not customers won't be able to load it.


PS: Unless I missed something, the problem you understood is already
mentioned in 6.3 Cross-origin data leakage.
Received on Thursday, 25 September 2014 18:39:00 UTC

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