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Re: [Integrity] Some comments on Cross-Origin leakage and content types

From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 21:24:16 -0700
Message-ID: <CAPfop_3AaynjGLacRS1c14zqyzYfBYBRLFNvZKmUuOJ437+KQA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Arjan Veenstra <arjan@veenstra.cx>
Cc: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Hi Arjan

thanks for taking a look at the spec!
Forgive me, but I can't help but wonder: did you take a look at Section

It defines restrictions on what SRI applies to and I think it is a
reasonably secure way of handling the issues you raise. Or are you
concerned despite the limits in the spec? Can you give a concrete threat as
an example, to help me understand better?


On 20 September 2014 01:19, Arjan Veenstra <arjan@veenstra.cx> wrote:

> Hi,
> I've been looking at this proposal mostly interested of the improved
> caching of common resources it might provide, so my mindset might be
> tainted somewhat. But looking at the section 6.3 it occurred to me that
> most risk mentioned there could be mitigated if the document author could
> specify the intended usage of the resource. A simple 'private' marker which
> tells the UA it's not allowed to add the resource to it's hash-based cache
> could protect sensitive resources from these type of attacks. Or perhaps
> the spec should err on the save side and only allow caching when resources
> are marked public.
> Behind this is the assumption there are two types of resources you want
> integrity checks on. The first being common public resources such as
> javascript libraries, the second being resources specific to your
> application which are hosted elsewhere. Wider caching is mostly useful for
> resources in the first category, but the presence of those resource is
> unlikely to leak any usable information. As a common resource it could have
> entered the cache from lots of places.
> Resources in the second category generally won't benefit from caching
> beyond the currently available caching mechanism, marking those private
> won't hurt performance but does effectively remove any new attack surface
> introduced by hash based caching.
> Of course there are edge cases, for instance a library which is 'public'
> but not commonly used. Finding a cache hit might still give a lower
> certainty indication a user visited a specific site. But an additional flag
> would allow document authors to act according to their own assessment of
> the risks.
> I'm in doubt if a request for a resource marked private should be allowed
> to be fulfilled from cache. I'm guessing that if the hash is secure that
> shouldn't be an issue.
> I'm also missing a description of how to handle scenarios where a resource
> might be available in multiple content types. For instance, a server might
> prefer to serve an image as svg but fall back to serving a png file when
> the accept header doesn't include svg. I could see something similar
> happening in the future with alternative scripting (e.g. Dart,
> Coffeescript, Typescript) languages where a server might serve either the
> original script or the compiled-to-javascript version based on the accept
> header. In more abstract terms I'd say that since an URL points to a
> resource which might be represented in different ways you'll always have to
> account for the possibility a resource has different representations.
> I guess the obvious solution would be to allow different hashes with
> different content types to be specified. The spec doesn't seem to forbid
> this, but it doesn't explicitly allow it either and tends to speak about
> the content type in singular form.
> The same applies to localized resources, as the content of an
> Accept-Language header might cause different content to be served as well.
> Perhaps a language attribute needs to be added as well.
> Regards,
> Arjan Veenstra
Received on Monday, 22 September 2014 04:25:03 UTC

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