- From: Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>
- Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 18:25:22 -0500
- To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
- Cc: Ángel González <angel@16bits.net>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
If you use an ephemeral cipher suite, which most browsers support •well• today, then the server-side SSL/TLS key will NOT be used to encrypt data, at all. -- Jim Manico @Manicode (808) 652-3805 > On Oct 21, 2014, at 6:07 PM, Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Ángel González <angel@16bits.net> wrote: > >>> On the bright side, it’s very good that the machine generates a fresh >>> key every time you re-enable HTTPS: That means that the key is not >>> static, or identical on all the routers of the same make or model. > >> That still doesn't mean there won't be duplicate keys. It is hard for a >> device to have good entropy after a reset. [1] Did you try resetting it >> a few times and comparing the generated keys? > > I know. No, I did not check; I was only concerned that the key was not > hard-coded. Given the many problems with Linux' CRNG, especially but > not only a device like that, I didn't bother checking any further. > >>> if a device is only marketable if its price point is so low that it >>> cannot be secure, perhaps it should disable itself after some >>> reasonable life-time >> -1 >> >> Users will perceive it as planned obsolescence for business reasons, and >> I wouldn't be surprised if producers treated it like that, too. > > Otherwise it's planned unsafety. > > Perhaps vendors could open source their abandonware. Even then, > though, most fielded devices would still be unsafe. >
Received on Tuesday, 21 October 2014 23:25:51 UTC