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Re: CSP: Problems with referrer and reflected-xss

From: Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 09:48:31 -0800
Message-ID: <545A62EF.1050103@mozilla.com>
To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
CC: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>, Glenn Adams <glenn@skynav.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
On 11/5/2014 2:06 AM, Mike West wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 8:38 AM, Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com
> 
>     This has been removed from CSP level 2.
> 
> A small point: reflected-xss has not been removed from CSP2. It's marked
> as At Risk, pending IE's feedback about whether or not they intend to
> implement it.

Sorry, you're right. I guess I'm on the less optimistic side of "at risk".

Regardless it should not be a controversial directive: it is simply a
synonym for the existing non-standard X-XSS-Protection header.
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ieinternals/archive/2011/01/31/controlling-the-internet-explorer-xss-filter-with-the-x-xss-protection-http-header.aspx

It seems generally useful to coalesce miscellaneous non-standard
security headers into a standard Content-Security-Policy that can be
documented in one place. If any given header has a strong constituency
that believes it should be standardized separately that's fine, too. In
this case reps from the two browser engines which support the
non-standard header seem to prefer CSP inclusion to a separate standard.

It does complicate the CSP rules for handling multiple policies, but we
already have the problem of defining what happens with multiple
X-XSS-Protection headers and should be able to simply re-use that behavior.

-Dan Veditz
Received on Wednesday, 5 November 2014 17:49:00 UTC

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