W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > May 2014

Re: Remove paths from CSP?

From: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 15:37:37 +0200
Message-ID: <CADnb78htbXe7RcfLwk6BE=dVvZ-dNDnp46r+YXkwkoGBJPmXGg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Cc: Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>, "Oda, Terri" <terri.oda@intel.com>, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, Egor Homakov <homakov@gmail.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, "Eduardo' Vela" <evn@google.com>
On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 3:17 PM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 2:55 PM, Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com> wrote:
>> * It doesn't resolve redirection login detection, which may add a new
>> security hole to previously secure sites, one against which sites cannot
>> protect themselves.
> I disagree that this is a unique consequence of CSP's behavior (as we've
> discussed at length), but I do agree that CSP makes this detection for those
> sites that do cross-origin easier than it is now.

Is this explained somewhere? So far we've made quite an effort to make
redirects atomic from an API's perspective.

>> * It thus adds an unfixable security issue for the foreseeable future
>> for all web sites. This might theoretically hinder the web moving
>> forwards in the future.
> For the subset of all websites that do cross-origin login (e.g. google.com
> -> accounts.google.com).

Sites delegating login seems pretty common these days.

Received on Tuesday, 20 May 2014 13:38:08 UTC

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