On Jun 27, 2014 5:02 PM, "'Peter Kasting' via Security-dev" < security-dev@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 3:55 PM, 'Chris Palmer' via blink-dev < blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: >> >> "Particularly powerful" would mean ... generally any feature that >> >> we would provide a user-settable permission or privilege to. > > > I don't really understand this last clause. Users of browsers can set many permissions, e.g. in Chrome the user can grant or deny sites the ability to use plugins, open popup windows, run Javascript, etc. I doubt you intended to suggest that a new feature with a similar scope to those should be restricted. > > PK There is, I think, a balance. The examples you gave are examples where we default positive (allow), but then allow the user to deny. In effect, all origins BUT X have access to a permission. However, for permissions where the assumption is default-deny (or prompt), those are certainly in scope. That's because if you grant Origin X access, and X is an origin delivered over an insecure transport, you've granted it to all origins, in effect. Would it make more sense to clarify that its in response to deny-by-default permissions? geolocation, audio, video all come to mind as modern deny features that would, ideally, have been restricted for the reasons listed - though that horse has long since left the barn.
Received on Saturday, 28 June 2014 00:36:11 UTC