- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 10:14:25 +0200
- To: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Cc: Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
- Message-ID: <CAKXHy=cb2hwkgtUXc8DdZ=8jB+9VU8uT_X2r=io4kcnRn-ZAgw@mail.gmail.com>
Hello, lovely Webappsecians, Over the last week or two, I've landed some changes to the spec which (I hope) resolve the outstanding issues folks have raised since I last asked about moving to last call (in January[1]). The remaining open issues on both GitHub and the webappsec tracker are targeting CSP 1.2, which I'd like to get started on once CSP 1.1 is safely on it's way out the door. I think CSP 1.1 is ready to move on; I'd like to see if the group agrees, hence this Call for Consensus to move to Last Call. Best case, you all agree. Hooray! Worst case, this is a forcing function for all of you to note the things you consider blockers, which is also a good outcome. :) Please read through the current draft, up for review at https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/, and send comments to public-webappsec@w3.org. Positive feedback is encouraged. This CfC will end at our next scheduled call (June 18th, 2014). --- The only major issue raised between January and now was covered in the long thread concerning redirects and paths (and, tangentially, all of CSP's reporting) that started at [2]. The resolution proposed in the draft is the following: * After a redirect, the path component of source expressions is ignored, as noted in https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/#source-list-paths-and-redirects * Redirects are blocked by default: authors must opt-in to enabling redirects (which must still match directives' source list) via the new 'unsafe-redirect' source expression: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec/commit/d1fd42a6df58ef2a7afedcd12ae2bff76a096d1a * Reporting does not include the origin of a redirect's target, but only the origin of the originally requested URL. I believe this is a reasonable set of compromises for CSP 1.1, does the working group agree? Are there additional issues that need to be resolved before LC which shouldn't be punted to CSP 1.2? Now's the time to speak up! [1]: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2014Jan/0121.html [2]: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2014Feb/0036.html -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com> Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891 Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)
Received on Wednesday, 11 June 2014 08:15:13 UTC