Re: [MIX] Comments on draft Mixed Content spec

On Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 7:09 AM, Tanvi Vyas <> wrote:

>  Hi Mike,
> Thank you very much for putting this spec together!  I went through it and
> have a few comments.
> 2.1 - localhost is included in the definition of assumed secure origin.
> In Firefox's implementation of the MCB, we block localhost.  We have had a
> number of requests to allow it, but Dan has responded with some good
> arguments to continue blocking it:

This fits into Brian's suggestion that we wrap localhost, file, and
intranet restrictions into the spec. I'll work on that.

> 3.1 - Sandboxed iframes
> There is some discussion here about whether sandboxed iframed should be
> considered optionally blockable passive content or active content -
>  We may need to
> block other allow-* values in addition to allow-top-level-navigation.

I'm quite open to coming up with some definition of what sandbox flags we'd
need to define in order to consider a frame suitably passive, and I'm
pretty sympathetic to the concerns raised in comment 6 on that bug. I'm not
really sure that there's any sufficiently safe combination that would
satisfy users, however (for example, see comment #3 of that bug).

+lcamtuf, who has opinions on this topic.

> Issue 2 & 3- Regarding form submissions, it is difficult to detect whether
> the target of a form is secure until the submit button is actually hit.
> The form action may be a call to a javascript function.  Without parsing
> through the function, the browser does not know whether or not the intended
> destination is secure.  Determining whether an insecure form is present and
> including UI to indicate this to the user (i.e. no green lock) seems
> impossible.  Perhaps someone has an idea on how we can do this?

One suggestion would be to examine the action of forms that are on the page
at parse-time. JavaScript could certainly add new and exciting
vulnerabilities dynamically, but throwing a mixed-content warning (and
disabling the form in some way?) if we see a known-bad form when parsing
seems like a reasonable first step.

> For Issue 2, Firefox presents a warning to the user before the data is
> actually submitted (
>  This
> warning has been around for many many years, so we may well be able to get
> away with it without much of a web-compatability issue.  We can look into
> the percentage of pages that hit this warning as a followup.

Data would be wonderful. Gimmie gimmie gimmie. :)

I'll try to get a similar metric into Blink.

4.3 - " Note: It is *strongly recommended* that users take advantage of
> such an option if provided."
> I'm not sure if we want to strongly recommend that users disable
> optionally blockable mixed passive content.  As stated elsewhere in the
> spec, that means that ~43% of secure pages will not function properly.

~43% of secure pages have some sort of mixed content (according to that
study I cited). Whether or not they're "functioning properly" depends on
what you mean by "properly" and "function". :) Worst case, a prominent
image is broken (30% of secure sites, according to that study), or a
video/audio is broken (no data in the study, so let's assume it's 0% :) ).

If it was even remotely practical, I'd recommend that users block HTTP
entirely. As it stands, recommending that users block mixed passive content
seems pretty reasonable, even if we as browser vendors can't practically
make that choice for them.

> 5.1 - Algorithm.  As Anne has mentioned, the algorithm included in the
> spec doesn't match the examples provided, but you are already planning to
> modify this.

Which one? I've updated the algorithms a bit in the last day or so: are
they still broken?

> 7 - the word "defined" is repeated.



Received on Wednesday, 4 June 2014 13:01:27 UTC