- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 15:25:28 +0200
- To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- Cc: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Received on Thursday, 3 July 2014 13:26:16 UTC
This is a problem with SRI generally. If you can determine that the load failed (and you can), then you can do this without the CORS bypass. -mike -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com> Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891 Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.) On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 3:21 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 2:02 AM, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl> > wrote: > > It seems that if you can already proof what the bits of a resource > > are, maybe you should be able to get hold of it with all the benefits > > of CORS. Probably given a secure enough hash algorithm. Have people > > been thinking about this? > > What if I know that the resource is one of $n values and so try $n > different loads, with different hash values, in order to find which it > is? > > > Cheers > > AGL > >
Received on Thursday, 3 July 2014 13:26:16 UTC