- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 11:44:56 +0200
- To: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>
- Cc: WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAKXHy=eEHz1oK-X=x86Bx68gGx=p62AkUaHqdFGfyFHw5OJPaQ@mail.gmail.com>
I think it's worth considering. I also think we should defer considering it until after we figure out if SRI is going to work at all. There are enough security-folk reasons to be worried about it; I'd like to put off adding fuel to that fire. :) -mike -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com> Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891 Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.) On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 11:39 AM, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 11:35 AM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > > By "get a hold of it", I guess you mean not returning an opaque response > for > > known cross-origin data? And allowing things like canvas reads for images > > and unsanitized error handling for script? > > > > *shrug* Makes sense, I suppose. If you know what the content is already, > > then the risks which prevent us from letting you play with it are > certainly > > less pressing. > > Yeah I'm not sure if we should do this, really. I'm led to believe > most CDNs are happy with CORS these days. But if there's still a > significant fraction that is not, this might be a way out. > > > -- > http://annevankesteren.nl/ >
Received on Thursday, 3 July 2014 09:45:43 UTC