- From: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
- Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 14:31:31 +0100
- To: Mitar <mmitar@gmail.com>
- Cc: Glenn Adams <glenn@skynav.com>, Mike Pomax Kamermans <pomax@nihongoresources.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAKXHy=cL=CNAA4fHYcLO982BXzmN3t2kX=9LJXjKZdN37cJp+Q@mail.gmail.com>
>From a process perspective: we closed Cox's formal objection in the last call, based on removing the sentence in question. As I noted in [1], I don't think there's any normative difference between the spec with or without that sentence: I don't plan on changing Blink's behavior, and I'd speculate that Mozilla doesn't intend to use this sentence's absence as a reason to stop working to allow add-ons to function in the presence of a page's CSP. That said, I personally agree with the sentiments expressed here and on the GitHub commit [2]: removing the sentence is probably the wrong way to resolve the objection, because it doesn't make the WG's general consensus clear. I believe the following fairly summarizes the discussion thus far (Glenn, and others, please correct me): * Cox objects to language that provides a blanket policy exception to extensions, for two reasons: 1. Compromised extensions may not be representing the will of the user. 2. Liability for catastrophic loss which could have been prevented if extensions' actions could be suppressed. * The WG, on the other hand, seems supportive of allowing extensions to bypass a page's CSP. For example, see the poll results from [3]: reps from Google, Mozilla, and others were generally disinterested in changing the spec's normative behavior. Cox's vote was the only positive response to #6 that I saw. With this in mind, I'm inclined to add a non-normative note to the spec along the lines of "Note that user agents are encouraged to allow third-party add-ons and JavaScript bookmarklets to bypass policy enforcement, either implicitly or based on the user's preference." On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:50 AM, Mitar <mmitar@gmail.com> wrote: > And such argumentation is really silly. First you are saying that > because there is a consensus and of course nobody will block, there is > no need to put this into the standard. And then also because there is > no consensus, there is nothing to put into the standard. > I don't think that's been my argument. In short, I removed the sentence because: 1. Extensions are vendor specific. 2. Vendor specific bits are, by their nature, non-interoperable. 3. Normative bits of the spec shouldn't regular vendor-specific bits of the user agent. I would be perfectly happy to add a non-normative note to the spec, explaining that it would be wonderful if vendor-specific things like extensions would continue to function despite a page's CSP. I > I can assure you that not all UAs will adopt the position of ignoring CSP > in the case of > > extensions/add-ons. In fact, I'm aware of a downstream specification > that mandates > > that UAs (that comply with that specification) must enforce CSP > policies, modulo explicit > > override by end user, in the case of extensions/add-ons. > Can you point to that spec, Glenn? I'm curious. -mike [1]: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2014Feb/0006.html [2]: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec/commit/cbfaa8edfadebf21a9c7428242c12e45934d8c55 [3]: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2013Sep/0086.html
Received on Monday, 24 February 2014 13:32:20 UTC