Re: referrer directive expressiveness

Added this to the draft spec in

If folks hate the names, bikeshedding is welcome. I'm not firmly attached
to them.


Mike West <>
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 4:18 PM, David Bruant <> wrote:

> Le 07/02/2014 15:07, Mike West a écrit :
>  +Adam
>> Hey David!
>> One the one hand, I agree with you that the current spec combines two
>> aspects into a single keyword. On the other, I agree with Adam of 2011 that
>> some of the combinations don't make much sense. I'd like to keep things
>> simple, and I hope we can do that by addressing your use-case, but sticking
>> to the single-keyword model.
> I came to agree with Adam in 2011 and still do. I just wanted to provide a
> background as complete as possible and lay down our options.
>  How about something like this hastily considered list?
>> none => no referrer header for any request (today's "none")
> I think that some websites break if sent no Referer header, but survive to
> a Referer set to the empty string. But I forgot where I read that. Does it
> ring a bell to someone?
> Maybe that was Accept...
>  none-when-insecure => no referrer header for HTTPS->HTTP (today's
>> "default")
>> origin-always => always send a referrer header containing only the origin
>> (today's "origin")
>> origin-when-cross-origin => full referrer header for same-origin
>> requests, origin referrer header for cross-origin requests
>> unsafe-url-always => full referrer header for any request (today's
>> "always")
>> Bikeshedding welcome...
> Looks good to me. I like the "unsafe-" for the last one as it suggests an
> additional danger or at least something to look into.
> David

Received on Monday, 10 February 2014 11:39:40 UTC