Re: [webappsec] Reminder: please send your preferences

Updating my previous noncommittal response:

> 2. We should include the application of 'unsafe-eval' semantics to the CSSOM in the core CSP 1.1 feature set? Agree / Disagree

Agree.

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Neil Matatall <neilm@twitter.com> wrote:
>> 1: We should close the feature set of CSP 1.1?  Agree / Disagree
>
> agree
>
>> 2. We should include the application of 'unsafe-eval' semantics to the CSSOM in the core CSP 1.1 feature set? Agree / Disagree
>
> Defer
>
>> 3. We should include the suborigin sandboxing proposal in the core CSP 1.1 feature set? Agree / Disagree
>
> Disagree
>
>> 4. We should include the "Session Origin Security" policy in the core CSP 1.1 feature set?  Agree / Disagree
>
> Disagree
>
>> 5. We should include the "cookie-scope" policy in the core CSP 1.1 feature set?  Agree / Disagree
>
> Disagree
>
>> 6. We should make changes to core CSP 1.1 behavior (including possibly specifying a new directive about user script) as requested by Bug 23357?  Agree / Disagree
>
> Disagree
>
>> 1. Flesh out Alex Russell's (http://infrequently.org/2013/05/use-case-zero/) and Yehuda Katz's (http://yehudakatz.com/2013/05/24/an-extensible-approach-to-browser-security-policy/) proposals. They are substantially more interesting than what we have at the moment. This has been on my plate for months.
>>2. Kill the DOM API for the moment, and do #1 in 1.2, along with a more complete integration with ServiceWorkers.
>>I'd like to do #1, but #2 is probably more realistic. I'll break this out into a separate thread.
>
> I agree this should be discussed :) I'm leaning towards #2...
>
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Carson, Cory <Cory.Carson@boeing.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> From: Brad Hill [mailto:hillbrad@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2013 5:12 PM
>> To: public-webappsec@w3.org
>> Subject: [webappsec] Reminder: please send your preferences
>>
>> This is a request again, for all WG members, to please send your response to this simple poll before our call on Tuesday:
>>
>> 1: We should close the feature set of CSP 1.1?  Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Abstain
>>
>> 2. We should include the application of 'unsafe-eval' semantics to the CSSOM in the core CSP 1.1 feature set? Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Agree
>>
>> 3. We should include the suborigin sandboxing proposal in the core CSP 1.1 feature set? Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Disagree
>>
>> 4. We should include the "Session Origin Security" policy in the core CSP 1.1 feature set?  Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Disagree
>>
>> 5. We should include the "cookie-scope" policy in the core CSP 1.1 feature set?  Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Disagree
>>
>> 6. We should make changes to core CSP 1.1 behavior (including possibly specifying a new directive about user script) as requested by Bug 23357?  Agree / Disagree
>>
>> Disagree
>>
>> ---
>>
>> Boeing is interested in suborigin sandboxing and "cookie-scope" because they address security concerns of large multi-component web applications. However, it is Boeing's opinion that 3 and 5 be incubated longer before Boeing backs them. Eg, perhaps there is a way to adjust suborigin sandboxing to include 'cookie-scope's goals?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>

Received on Tuesday, 22 October 2013 18:03:09 UTC