W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > December 2013

Re: Hashes/Nonce Source and unsafe-inline

From: Neil Matatall <neilm@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:59:27 -0800
Message-ID: <CAOFLtbgFUVQttB+4dPuRO_0h9FW17ioOggejRYH9vKDhdy=Q2g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
Cc: Dionysis Zindros <dionyziz@gmail.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>

This change was for backwards compatibility reasons. So the
'unsafe-inline' would be bypassed by actions performed by
nonce-validated scripts?

On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com> wrote:
> For example, https://www.facebook.com/ has a policy that includes
> 'unsafe-inline' and the page uses inline event handlers. Seemingly,
> the aim of the policy is to control what external scripts are loaded
> and not just XSS mitigation.
> Imagine a website that wants to do get finer-grained control and uses
> nonces for this. So, for example, the policy could include "script-src
> 'unsafe-inline' nonce-longrandomvalue" and some trusted code on the
> page knows the longrandomvalue and only that code can add external
> scripts to the page by creating a script element with longrandomvalue
> as the nonce attribute. With the change that Mike pushed, inline event
> handlers for this page would stop working. This does not look right to
> me.
> --dev
> On 13 December 2013 00:13, Dionysis Zindros <dionyziz@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I'm not really sure what you mean by this, could you elaborate, maybe
>> with an example?
>> Thank you.
>> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:01 PM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I agree with you on hash sources. I don't believe this is true for
>>> nonce sources, since one of the use cases nonces support is including
>>> scripts from URLs that you only know at runtime.
>>> --dev
>>> On 12 December 2013 16:00, Dionysis Zindros <dionyziz@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> Hi
>>>>> [creating a separate thread since there were other discussions ongoing
>>>>> in the other]
>>>>>> 2. 'unsafe-inline' is disabled if either a hash or nonce is present.
>>>>>>      [3] https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/content-security-policy/rev/8db37e53da82
>>>>> Imagine a website that wants to control what external scripts are
>>>>> loaded. The website uses inline  event handlers too. The hosts for
>>>>> external scripts can be dynamic (e.g., it is on a CDN) and thus it
>>>>> uses nonces to load them at runtime. In the new design, all the event
>>>>> handlers would stop working. I am not sure this is what we want.
>>>> Inline event handlers are insecure and prone to XSS, so we want to
>>>> block them. There's no point in enabling both unsafe-inline and (hash
>>>> or nonce) at the same time. The point of a hash or a nonce is to block
>>>> all inline scripts except the ones whitelisted. Allowing inline
>>>> scripts completely defeats the purpose of having hashes or nonces.
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>> Dev
Received on Friday, 13 December 2013 19:59:55 UTC

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