I'm interested in an example attack this would stop, which depends uniquely on inner/outerHTML. The only use I can think of for this off the top of my head is if you're attempting to use a supervisory script to monitor and approve changes to the DOM - which the implementation details of innerHTML typically do an end-run around. Otherwise, isn't innerHTML functionally equivalent to other DOM-based APIs? (and shouldn't the internal implementation be subject to the same CSP constraints already?) -Brad > -----Original Message----- > From: Ian Melven [mailto:imelven@mozilla.com] > Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2013 11:08 AM > To: WebAppSec WG > Subject: CSP and innerHTML > > > Hi, > > recently Jonas Sicking raised the idea of having a CSP directive that would > block usage of innerHTML > > the primary motivation for doing this seems to be additional defence in > depth on top of CSP already restricting script and style injections > > i'm curious what others think of this idea and looking for feedback :) > > thanks, > ianReceived on Tuesday, 30 April 2013 18:17:46 UTC
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